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Guidelines for Prevention of Nosocomial Pneumonia
Summary
This document updates and replaces CDC’s previously published “Guideline
for Prevention of Nosocomial Pneumonia” ( Infect Control 1982;3:327–33, Respir
Care 1983;28:221–32, and Am J Infect Control 1983;11:230–44). This revised
guideline is designed to reduce the incidence of nosocomial pneumonia and is
intended for use by personnel who are responsible for surveillance and control
of infections in acute-care hospitals; the information may not be applicable in
long-term–care facilities because of the unique characteristics of such settings.
This revised guideline addresses common problems encountered by infection-
control practitioners regarding the prevention and control of nosocomial
pneumonia in U.S. hospitals. Sections on the prevention of bacterial pneumonia
in mechanically ventilated and/or critically ill patients, care of respiratory-
therapy devices, prevention of cross-contamination, and prevention of viral
lower respiratory tract infections (e.g., respiratory syncytial virus [RSV] and in-
fluenza infections) have been expanded and updated. New sections on
Legionnaires disease and pneumonia caused by Aspergillus sp. have been in-
cluded. Lower respiratory tract infection caused by Mycobacterium tuberculosis
is not addressed in this document. Part I, “An Overview of the Prevention of
Nosocomial Pneumonia, 1994,” provides the background information for the
consensus recommendations of the Hospital Infection Control Practices Advi-
sory Committee (HICPAC) in Part II, “Recommendations for Prevention of
Nosocomial Pneumonia.”
Pneumonia is the second most common nosocomial infection in the United
States and is associated with substantial morbidity and mortality. Most patients
who have nosocomial pneumonia are infants, young children, and persons
>65 years of age; persons who have severe underlying disease, immuno-
suppression, depressed sensorium, and/or cardiopulmonary disease; and per-
sons who have had thoracoabdominal surgery. Although patients receiving
mechanically assisted ventilation do not represent a major proportion of pa-
tients who have nosocomial pneumonia, they are at highest risk for acquiring
the infection. Most bacterial nosocomial pneumonias occur by aspiration of bac-
teria colonizing the oropharynx or upper gastrointestinal tract of the patient.
Because intubation and mechanical ventilation alter first-line patient defenses,
they greatly increase the risk for nosocomial bacterial pneumonia. Pneumonias
caused by Legionella sp., Aspergillus sp., and influenza virus are often caused by
inhalation of contaminated aerosols. RSV infection usually occurs after viral
inoculation of the conjunctivae or nasal mucosa by contaminated hands. Tradi-
tional preventive measures for nosocomial pneumonia include decreasing
aspiration by the patient, preventing cross-contamination or colonization via
hands of personnel, appropriate disinfection or sterilization of respiratory-
therapy devices, use of available vaccines to protect against particular infec-
tions, and education of hospital staff and patients. New measures being
investigated involve reducing oropharyngeal and gastric colonization by patho-
genic microorganisms.
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Part 1. An Overview of the Prevention
of Nosocomial Pneumonia, 1994
INTRODUCTION
This document updates and replaces CDC’s previously published “Guideline for Pre-
vention of Nosocomial Pneumonia” (Infect Control 1982;3:327–33, Respir Care 1983;
28:221–32, and Am J Infect Control 1983;11:230–44). This revised guideline is designed
to reduce the incidence of nosocomial pneumonia and is intended for use by person-
nel who are responsible for surveillance and control of infections in acute-care
hospitals; the information may not be applicable in long-term–care facilities because
of the unique characteristics of such settings.
This revised guideline addresses common problems encountered by infection-control
practitioners regarding the prevention and control of nosocomial pneumonia in U.S.
hospitals. Sections concerning the prevention of bacterial pneumonia in mechanically
ventilated and/or critically ill patients, care of respiratory-therapy devices, prevention
of cross-contamination, and prevention of viral lower respiratory tract infections (e.g.,
respiratory syncytial virus [RSV] and influenza infections) have been expanded and
updated. New sections on Legionnaires disease and pneumonia caused by Aspergil-
lus sp. have been included. Lower respiratory tract infection caused by Myco-
bacterium tuberculosis is not addressed in this document; CDC published such recom-
mendations previously (1 ).
Part I, “An Overview of the Prevention of Nosocomial Pneumonia, 1994,” provides the
background information for the consensus recommendations of the Hospital Infection
Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC) in Part II, “Recommendations for Pre-
vention of Nosocomial Pneumonia.” HICPAC was established in 1991 to provide
advice and guidance to the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary for Health, U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services; the Director, CDC; and the Director, National
Center for Infectious Diseases (NCID), CDC, regarding the practice of hospital infection
control and strategies for surveillance, prevention, and control of nosocomial infec-
tions in U.S. hospitals. HICPAC also advises CDC on periodic updating of guidelines
and other policy statements regarding prevention of nosocomial infections. This
guideline is the first of a series of CDC guidelines being revised by HICPAC and NCID.
This guideline can be an important resource for educating health-care workers
(HCWs) regarding prevention and control of nosocomial respiratory tract infections.
Because education of HCWs is the cornerstone of an effective infection-control pro-
gram, hospitals should give high priority to continuing infection-control educational
programs for these personnel.
BACKGROUND
Pneumonia is the second most common nosocomial infection in the United States and
is associated with substantial morbidity and mortality. Most patients who have noso-
comial pneumonia are infants, young children, and persons >65 years of age; persons
who have severe underlying disease, immunosuppression, depressed sensorium,
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and/or cardiopulmonary disease; and persons who have had thoracoabdominal sur-
gery. Although patients receiving mechanically assisted ventilation do not represent a
major proportion of patients who have nosocomial pneumonia, they are at highest
risk for acquiring the infection.
Most bacterial nosocomial pneumonias occur by aspiration of bacteria colonizing the
oropharynx or upper gastrointestinal tract of the patient. Because intubation and me-
chanical ventilation alter first-line patient defenses, they greatly increase the risk for
nosocomial bacterial pneumonia. Pneumonias caused by Legionella sp., Aspergillus
sp., and influenza virus are often caused by inhalation of contaminated aerosols. RSV
infection usually occurs after viral inoculation of the conjunctivae or nasal mucosa by
contaminated hands.
Traditional preventive measures for nosocomial pneumonia include decreasing aspi-
ration by the patient, preventing cross-contamination or colonization via hands of
HCWs, appropriate disinfection or sterilization of respiratory-therapy devices, use of
available vaccines to protect against particular infections, and education of hospital
staff and patients. New measures being investigated involve reducing oropharyngeal
and gastric colonization by pathogenic microorganisms.
BACTERIAL PNEUMONIA
 I. Etiologic Agents
The reported distribution of etiologic agents that cause nosocomial pneumonia
differs between hospitals because of different patient populations and diagnostic
methods employed (2–10 ). In general, however, bacteria have been the most fre-
quently isolated pathogens (2–6,9,11–13 ). During 1986–1989, aerobic bacteria
comprised at least 73%, and fungi 4%, of isolates from sputum and tracheal aspi-
rates obtained from patients who had pneumonia at the University of Michigan
Hospitals and at hospitals participating in the National Nosocomial Infection Sur-
veillance (NNIS) System; only a few anaerobic bacteria and no viruses were
reported, probably because anaerobic and viral cultures were not performed rou-
tinely in the reporting hospitals (Table 1) (3 ). Similarly, cultures of bronchoscopic
specimens obtained from mechanically ventilated patients who had pneumonia
have rarely yielded anaerobes (5–7,9,11,14,15 ). Only one study, which was based
primarily on cultures of transtracheal aspirates obtained from patients not receiv-
ing mechanically assisted ventilation, reported a predominance of anaerobes (4 ).
Nosocomial bacterial pneumonias are frequently polymicrobial (4,7,9,11,12,15–
19 ) , and gram-negative bacilli are usually the predominant organisms (Table 1)
(2–6,9,11–13 ). However, Staphylococcus aureus (especially methicillin-resistant
S. aureus) (5,7,10,15,20,21 ) and other gram-positive cocci, including Streptococ-
cus pneumoniae (5,7 ), have emerged recently as important isolates (14 ). In
addition, Haemophilus influenzae has been isolated from mechanically ventilated
patients who had pneumonia that occurred within 48–96 hours after intubation
(3–5,12,15,22 ). In hospitals participating in the NNIS, Pseudomonas aeruginosa,
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Enterobacter sp., Klebsiella pneumoniae, Escherichia coli, Serratia marcescens,
and Proteus sp. comprised 50% of the isolates from cultures of respiratory tract
specimens obtained from patients for whom nosocomial pneumonia was diag-
nosed by using clinical criteria; S. aureus accounted for 16%, and H. influenzae,
for 6% (Table 1) (3 ). Another study reported that gram-negative bacilli were pre-
sent in 75% of quantitative cultures of protected-specimen brushings (PSB)
obtained from patients who had acquired nosocomial pneumonia after receiving
mechanically assisted ventilation; 40% of these cultures were polymicrobial (5 ).
In another published report, 20% of pathogens recovered from cultures of PSB,
blood, pleural fluid, or percutaneous lung aspirate were gram-negative bacilli in
pure culture, and 17% were polymicrobial; however, 54% of specimens did not
yield any microorganism, probably because the patients from whom these cul-
tures were obtained had been treated with antibiotics (6 ).
 II. Diagnosis
Nosocomial bacterial pneumonia has been difficult to diagnose (7,8,16,23–32 ).
Frequently, the criteria for diagnosis have been fever, cough, and development of
purulent sputum, in conjunction with radiologic evidence of a new or progressive
pulmonary infiltrate, a suggestive Gram stain, and positive cultures of sputum,
tracheal aspirate, pleural fluid, or blood (3,4,23,25,33–36 ). Although clinical find-
ings in conjunction with cultures of sputum or tracheal specimens may be
sensitive for bacterial pathogens, they are highly nonspecific, especially in pa-
tients receiving mechanically assisted ventilation (8,9,12–15,18,24–26,29,31,
37–42 ) ; conversely, cultures of blood or pleural fluid have very low sensitivity
(8,18,19,43 ).
Because of these problems, a group of investigators recently formulated consen-
sus recommendations for standardizing methods used to diagnose pneumonia in
clinical research studies of ventilator-associated pneumonia (44–46 ). These meth-
ods involve bronchoscopic techniques such as quantitative culture of PSB
(5,7–9,13,15,27,31,38,41,47,48 ), bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL) (7,12,41,47,49–54 ),
and protected BAL (pBAL) (14 ). The reported sensitivities of such methods have
ranged, depending on the tests or diagnostic criteria with which they were com-
pared, from 70% to 100%, and the reported specificities of these methods have
ranged from 60% to 100%. These methods are invasive and might cause compli-
cations such as hypoxemia, bleeding, or arrhythmia (8,13,42,44,52,55,56 ). In
addition, the sensitivity of the PSB procedure may be decreased for patients re-
ceiving antibiotic therapy (9,13,27 ). Nonbronchoscopic (NB) procedures (e.g.,
NB-pBAL [12,27,57,58 ] or NB-PSB [13 ], which utilize blind catheterization of the
distal airways) and quantitative culture of endotracheal aspirate (59,60 ) have
been developed recently. Of these procedures, endotracheal aspirate culture
might be the most practical. The use of these bronchoscopic and nonbroncho-
scopic diagnostic tests could help to better define the epidemiology of noso-
comial pneumonia, especially in patients receiving mechanically assisted ventila-
tion; however, additional studies are needed to determine each test’s applicability
in daily clinical practice.

















TABLE 1. Microorganisms isolated from respiratory tract specimens obtained by various representative methods from adult
patients who had a diagnosis of nosocomial pneumonia, by epidemiologic investigation
Category Schaberg (3 ) Bartlett (4 ) Fagon (5 ) Torres (6 )
Hospital type NNIS and UMH* Veterans General General
Patients studied
Ventilated or nonventilated Mixed Mixed Ventilated Ventilated
No. of patients N/A† 159 49 78
No. of episodes of pneumonia N/A 159 52 78













No organism isolated N/A 0 0 54%§
Polymicrobial N/A 54%§ 40%§ 13%§
No. of isolates 15,499 314 111 N/A
Aerobic bacteria
Gram-negative bacilli 50%¶ 46%** 75%** 16%††
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 17%¶ 9%** 31%** 5%††
Enterobacter sp. 11 4 2 0
Klebsiella sp. 7 23 4 0
Escherichia coli 6 14 8 0
Serratia sp. 5 0 0 1
Proteus sp. 3 11 15 1
Citrobacter sp. 1 0 2 0
Acinetobacter calcoaceticus N/A 0 15 9
Haemophilus influenzae 6%¶ 17%** 10%** 0%††
Legionella sp. N/A N/A 2%** 2%††
Other N/A 0 10 0
Gram-positive cocci 17%¶ 56%** 52%** 4%††
Staphylococcus aureus 16%¶ 25%** 33%** 2%††
Streptococcus sp. 1 31 21 2















TABLE 1. Microorganisms isolated from respiratory tract specimens obtained by various representative methods from adult
patients who had a diagnosis of nosocomial pneumonia, by epidemiologic investigation
Category Schaberg (3 ) Bartlett (4 ) Fagon (5 ) Torres (6 )
Anaerobes N/A 35%** 2%** 0
Peptostreptococcus N/A 14%** N/A 0
Fusobacterium sp. N/A 10 N/A 0
Peptococcus sp. N/A 11 N/A 0
Bacteroides melaninogenicus N/A 9 N/A 0
Bacteroides fragilis N/A 8 N/A 0
Fungi 4%¶ N/A 0 1%††
Aspergillus sp. N/A N/A 0 1%††
Candida sp. 4%¶ N/A 0 0
Viruses N/A N/A N/A N/A
— Continued
 *National Nosocomial Infection Surveillance System and University of Michigan Hospitals.
† Not applicable (i.e., not tested or not reported).
§ Percentage of episodes.
¶ Percentage of isolates.
**Percentage of episodes; percentages not additive because of polymicrobial etiology in some episodes.
†† Percentage of patients with pure culture.
III. Epidemiology
Results of the NNIS indicate that pneumonias (diagnosed on the basis of the CDC
surveillance definition of nosocomial pneumonia) account for approximately 15%
of all hospital-associated infections and are the second most common type of
nosocomial infection after those of the urinary tract (2,61 ). In 1984, the overall
incidence of lower respiratory tract infection was six cases per 1,000 discharged
patients (2 ). The incidence per 1,000 discharged patients ranged from 4.2 cases in
nonteaching hospitals to 7.7 in university-affiliated hospitals, probably reflecting
institutional differences in the level of patients’ risk for acquiring nosocomial
pneumonia.
Nosocomial bacterial pneumonia often has been identified as a postoperative
infection (62,63 ). In the Study of the Efficacy of Nosocomial Infection Control,
which was conducted in the 1970s, 75% of reported cases of nosocomial bacterial
pneumonia occurred in patients who had had a surgical operation; the risk was
38 times greater for patients who had thoracoabdominal procedures than for
those who had procedures involving other body sites (63 ). More recent
epidemiologic studies, including NNIS studies, have identified other subsets of
patients at high risk for acquiring nosocomial bacterial pneumonia. Such patients
include persons >70 years of age; persons who have endotracheal intubation
and/or mechanically assisted ventilation, a depressed level of consciousness (par-
ticularly those with closed-head injury), or underlying chronic lung disease; and
persons who have previously had an episode of a large-volume aspiration. Other
risk factors include 24-hour ventilator-circuit changes, hospitalization during the
fall or winter, stress-bleeding prophylaxis with cimetidine (either with or without
antacid), administration of antimicrobials, presence of a nasogastric tube, severe
trauma, and recent bronchoscopy (6,34,35,64–74 ).
The NNIS has stratified the incidence density of nosocomial pneumonia by pa-
tients’ use of mechanical ventilation and type of intensive-care unit (ICU). From
1986 through 1990, the median rate of ventilator-associated pneumonia cases per
1,000 ventilator-days ranged from 4.7 cases in pediatric ICUs to 34.4 cases in burn
ICUs (66 ). In comparison, the median rate of nonventilator-associated pneumonia
cases per 1,000 ICU-days ranged from zero cases in pediatric and respiratory ICUs
to 3.2 cases in trauma ICUs.
Nosocomial pneumonia has been associated with high fatality rates. Crude mor-
tality rates of 20%–50% and attributable mortality rates of 30%–33% have been
reported; in one study, the number of deaths attributed to pneumonia reflected
60% of all deaths resulting from nosocomial infections (17,35,74–80 ). Patients re-
ceiving mechanically assisted ventilation have higher mortality rates than do
patients not receiving ventilation support; however, other factors (e.g., the pa-
tient’s underlying disease[s] and organ failure) are stronger predictors of death in
patients who have pneumonia (34,74 ).
Analyses of pneumonia-associated morbidity have indicated that pneumonia
could prolong hospitalization by 4–9 days (79–83 ); in the United States, a conser-
vative estimate of the direct cost of this prolonged hospitalization is $1.2 billion
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per year (83 ). Nosocomial pneumonia is a major infection-control problem be-
cause of its reported frequency, associated high fatality rate, and attendant costs.
IV. Pathogenesis
Bacteria can invade the lower respiratory tract by aspiration of oropharyngeal or-
ganisms, inhalation of aerosols containing bacteria, or, less frequently, by
hematogenous spread from a distant body site (Figure 1). In addition, bacterial
translocation from the gastrointestinal tract has been hypothesized recently as a
mechanism for infection. Of these routes, aspiration is believed to be the most
important for both nosocomial and community-acquired pneumonia.
In radioisotope-tracer studies, 45% of healthy adults were found to aspirate dur-
ing sleep (84 ). Persons who swallow abnormally (e.g., those who have depressed
consciousness, respiratory tract instrumentation and/or mechanically assisted
ventilation, or gastrointestinal tract instrumentation or diseases) or who have just
undergone surgery are particularly likely to aspirate (6,34,35,63,85–87 ).
The high incidence of gram-negative bacillary pneumonia in hospitalized patients
might result from factors that promote colonization of the pharynx by gram-

































FIGURE 1. Pathogenesis of nosocomial bacterial pneumonia
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respiratory tract (33,88–91 ). Although aerobic gram-negative bacilli are recovered
infrequently or are found in low numbers in pharyngeal cultures of healthy per-
sons (88,92 ), the likelihood of colonization substantially increases in comatose
patients, in patients treated with antimicrobial agents, and in patients who have
hypotension, acidosis, azotemia, alcoholism, diabetes mellitus, leukocytosis,
leukopenia, pulmonary disease, or nasogastric or endotracheal tubes in place
(33,91,93,94 ).
Oropharyngeal or tracheobronchial colonization by gram-negative bacilli begins
with the adherence of the microorganisms to the host’s epithelial cells (90,95–
97 ) . Adherence may be affected by multiple factors associated with the bacteria
(e.g., presence of pili, cilia, capsule, or production of elastase or mucinase), host
cell (e.g., surface proteins and polysaccharides), and environment (e.g., pH and
presence of mucin in respiratory secretions) (89,90,95,98–107 ). Although the ex-
act interactions between these factors have not been fully elucidated, studies
indicate that certain substances (e.g., fibronectin) can inhibit the adherence of
gram-negative bacilli to host cells (98,100,108 ). Conversely, certain conditions
(e.g., malnutrition, severe illness, or postoperative state) can increase adherence
of gram-negative bacteria (89,98,102,107,109 ).
The stomach also might be an important reservoir of organisms that cause noso-
comial pneumonia (34,110–114 ). The role of the stomach as such a reservoir
might differ depending on the patient’s underlying conditions and on prophylactic
or therapeutic interventions (22,111,115–118 ). In healthy persons, few bacteria
entering the stomach survive in the presence of hydrochloric acid at pH <2
(119,120 ). However, when gastric pH increases from the normal levels to ≥4,
microorganisms are able to multiply to high concentrations in the stomach
(117,119,121–123 ). This can occur in elderly patients (121 ); in patients who have
achlorhydria (119 ), ileus, or upper gastrointestinal disease; and in patients re-
ceiving enteral feeding, antacids, or histamine-2 [H-2] antagonists (111,117,
118,123–125 ). Other factors (e.g., duodeno-gastric reflux and the presence of bile)
may contribute to gastric colonization in patients who have impaired intestinal
motility; these other factors need further investigation (116 ).
Bacteria also can enter the lower respiratory tract of hospitalized patients through
inhalation of aerosols generated primarily by contaminated respiratory-therapy
or anesthesia-breathing equipment (126–129 ). Outbreaks related to the use of
respiratory-therapy equipment have been associated with contaminated nebuliz-
ers, which are humidification devices that produce large amounts of aerosol
droplets <4 µm via ultrasound, spinning disk, or the Venturi mechanism
(126,129,130 ). When the fluid in the reservoir of a nebulizer becomes contami-
nated with bacteria, the aerosol produced may contain high concentrations of
bacteria that can be deposited deep in the patient’s lower respiratory tract
(126,130,131 ). Contaminated aerosol inhalation is particularly hazardous for in-
tubated patients because endotracheal and tracheal tubes provide direct access to
the lower respiratory tract. In contrast to nebulizers, bubble-through or wick hu-
midifiers primarily increase the water-vapor (or molecular-water) content of
inspired gases. Although heated bubble-through humidifiers generate aerosol
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droplets, they do so in quantities that may not be clinically important (127,132 );
wick humidifiers do not generate aerosols.
Bacterial pneumonia has resulted, in rare instances, from hematogenous spread
of infection to the lung from another infection site (e.g., pneumonia resulting from
purulent phlebitis or right-sided endocarditis). Another mechanism, translocation
of viable bacteria from the lumen of the gastrointestinal tract through epithelial
mucosa to the mesenteric lymph nodes and to the lung, has been demonstrated
in animal models (133 ). Translocation is postulated to occur in patients with im-
munosuppression, cancer, or burns (133 ); however, data are insufficient to
describe this mechanism in humans (134 ).
 V. Risk Factors and Control Measures
Several large studies have examined the potential risk factors for nosocomially
acquired bacterial pneumonia (Table 2) (6,34,35,135,136 ). Although specific risk
factors have differed between study populations, they can be grouped into the
following general categories: a) host factors (e.g., extremes of age and severe un-
derlying conditions, including immunosuppression); b) factors that enhance
colonization of the oropharynx and/or stomach by microorganisms (e.g., admini-
stration of antimicrobials, admission to an ICU, underlying chronic lung disease,
or coma); c) conditions favoring aspiration or reflux (e.g., endotracheal intuba-
tion, insertion of nasogastric tube, or supine position); d) conditions requiring
prolonged use of mechanical ventilatory support with potential exposure to con-
taminated respiratory equipment and/or contact with contaminated or colonized
hands of HCWs; and e) factors that impede adequate pulmonary toilet (e.g., un-
dergoing surgical procedures that involve the head, neck, thorax, or upper
abdomen or being immobilized as a result of trauma or illness) (6,33–35,62,73,
74,135 ).
A. Oropharyngeal, Tracheal, and Gastric Colonization
The association between colonization of the oropharynx (88,137 ), trachea
(138 ), or stomach (110,111,117,123 ) and predisposition to gram-negative bac-
illary pneumonia prompted efforts to prevent infection by using either
prophylactic local application of antimicrobial agent(s) (139,140 ) or local bac-
terial interference (141,142 ). Although early studies suggested that the first
method (i.e., use of aerosolized antimicrobials) could eradicate common gram-
negative pathogens from the upper respiratory tract (138 ), superinfection
occurred in some patients receiving this therapy (139–141,143,144 ). The sec-
ond method (i.e., bacterial interference [with alpha-hemolytic streptococci])
has been used successfully by some investigators to prevent oropharyngeal
colonization by aerobic gram-negative bacilli (141 ). However, the efficacy of
this method for general usage has not been evaluated.
In many studies, the administration of antacids and H-2 blockers for prevention
of stress bleeding in critically ill, postoperative, and/or mechanically ventilated


















TABLE 2. Risk factors and suggested infection-control measures for preventing nosocomial pneumonia
Disease/Risk factors Suggested infection-control measures
Bacterial pneumonia
Host-related (persons ages >65 yrs)
• Underlying illness:
– Chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease
Perform incentive spirometry, positive end-expiratory pressure, or continuous positive
airway pressure by face mask.
– Immunosuppression Avoid exposure to potential nosocomial pathogens; decrease duration of
immunosuppression (e.g., by administration of granulocyte macrophage colony stimulating
factor [GMCSF]).
– Depressed consciousness Administer central nervous system depressants cautiously.
– Surgery (thoracic/abdominal) Properly position patients; promote early ambulation; appropriately control pain.
Device-related Properly clean, sterilize or disinfect, and handle devices; remove devices as soon as the
indication for their use ceases.
• Endotracheal intubation and
mechanical ventilation





elevation); use nonalkalinizing gastric cytoprotective agent on patients at risk for stress
bleeding; do not routinely change ventilator circuits more often than every 48 hours; drain
and discard inspiratory-tubing condensate, or use heat-moisture exchanger if indicated. 
• Nasogastric-tube (NGT) placement
and enteral feeding
Routinely verify appropriate tube placement; promptly remove NGT when no longer
needed; drain residual; place patient in semirecumbent position as described above.
Personnel- or procedure-related
• Cross-contamination by hands Educate and train personnel; wash hands adequately and wear gloves appropriately;
conduct surveillance for cases of pneumonia and give feedback to personnel.
• Antibiotic administration Use antibiotics prudently, especially in patients in intensive-care units who are at high risk.
Legionnaires disease
Host-related
• Immunosuppression Decrease duration of immunosuppression.
Device-related
• Contaminated aerosol from devices Sterilize/disinfect aerosol-producing devices before use; use only sterile water for
respiratory humidifying devices; do not use cool-mist room-air humidifiers without
















TABLE 2. Risk factors and suggested infection-control measures for preventing nosocomial pneumonia
Disease/Risk factors Suggested infection-control measures
Environment-related
• Aerosols from contaminated water
supply
Hyperchlorinate or superheat hospital water system; routinely clean water-supply system;
consider use of sterile water for drinking by immunosuppressed patients.
• Cooling-tower draft Properly design, place, and maintain cooling towers.
Aspergillosis
Host-related
• Severe granulocytopenia Decrease duration of immunosuppression (e.g., by administration of GMCSF); place
patients who have severe and prolonged granulocytopenia in a protected environment.
Environment-related
• Construction activity Remove granulocytopenic patients from vicinity of construction; if not already done, place
severely granulocytopenic patients in a protected environment; make severely
granulocytopenic patients wear a mask when they leave the protected environment.
• Other environmental sources of
aspergilli
Routinely maintain hospital air-handling systems and rooms of immunosuppressed
patients.
Respiratory syncytial virus infection
(RSV)
Host-related
• Persons ages <2 yrs; congenital
pulmonary/cardiac disease;
immunosuppression
Consider routine preadmission screening of high-risk patients for severe RSV infection,
followed by cohorting of patients and nursing personnel during hospital outbreaks of RSV
infection.
Personnel- or procedure-related
• Cross-contamination by hands Educate personnel; wash hands; wear gloves; wear a gown; during outbreaks, use private
rooms or cohort patients and nursing personnel, and limit visitors.
Influenza
Host-related
• Persons ages >65 yrs;
immunosuppression
Vaccinate patients who are at high risk before the influenza season begins each year; use
amantadine or rimantadine for chemoprophylaxis during an outbreak.
Personnel-related
• Infected personnel Before the influenza season each year, vaccinate personnel who provide care for high-risk
patients; use amantadine or rimantadine for prophylaxis and treatment during an outbreak.
— Continued
patients has been associated with gastric bacterial overgrowth (34,112,113,
118,122,123,145–147 ). Sucralfate, a cytoprotective agent that has little effect
on gastric pH and may have bactericidal properties of its own, has been sug-
gested as a potential substitute for antacids and H-2 blockers (148–150 ). The
results of clinical trials comparing the risk for pneumonia in patients receiving
sucralfate with that in patients treated with antacids and/or H-2 blockers have
been variable (112,118,147,148,151–153 ). In most randomized trials, ICU pa-
tients receiving mechanically assisted ventilation who were treated either with
only antacids or with antacids and H-2 blockers had increased gastric pH, high
bacterial counts in the gastric fluid, and increased risk for pneumonia in com-
parison with patients treated with sucralfate (112,118,147,148,151 ). In one
study of a large number of patients, the incidence of early-onset pneumonia
(i.e., onset occurring ≤4 days after intubation) did not differ between patient
groups, but late-onset pneumonia occurred in 5% of 76 patients treated with
sucralfate, 16% of 69 treated with antacids, and 21% of 68 treated with an H-2
blocker (147 ). Conversely, a meta-analysis of data from eight earlier studies
(154 ) and a later study comparing sucralfate with ranitidine (153 ) did not indi-
cate a strong association between nosocomial pneumonia and drugs that
increase gastric pH. Additional studies, in which bronchoscopy with either PSB
or BAL is used to more reliably diagnose pneumonia, are being conducted to
compare the efficacy of sucralfate and ranitidine.
Selective decontamination of the digestive tract (SDD) is another strategy de-
signed to prevent bacterial colonization and lower respiratory tract infection in
mechanically ventilated patients (155–179 ). SDD is aimed at preventing oro-
pharyngeal and gastric colonization with aerobic gram-negative bacilli and
Candida sp. without altering the anaerobic flora (Table 3). Various SDD regi-
mens use a combination of locally administered nonabsorbable antibiotic
agents, such as polymyxin and an aminoglycoside (either tobramycin, gen-
tamicin, or, rarely, neomycin) or a quinolone (either norfloxacin or cipro-
floxacin) coupled with either amphotericin B or nystatin. The local antimicro-
bial preparation is applied as a paste to the oropharynx and administered
either orally or via the nasogastric tube four times a day. In addition, in many
studies, a systemic (intravenous) antimicrobial (e.g., cefotaxime or trimetho-
prim) is administered to the patient.
Although most studies (155–158,160–167,169,170,175–177 ), including two
meta-analyses (171,178 ), have demonstrated a decrease in the rates of noso-
comial respiratory infections after SDD, these studies have been difficult to
assess because they have differed in design and study population and many
have had short follow-up periods (Table 3). In most of these studies, the diag-
nosis of pneumonia was based on clinical criteria; bronchoscopy with BAL or
PSB was used in only a few studies (159,162,173,175–177,179 ).
Two recently published reports of large, double-blind, placebo-controlled trials
demonstrated no benefit from SDD (173,174 ). One of these studies, which was
conducted in France, noted that the incidence of gram-negative bacillary pneu-
monia decreased significantly after SDD, but this decrease was not accom-
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panied by a decrease in pneumonia from all causes (173 ). In the other study,
no differences were noted between patients randomly assigned to SDD or pla-
cebo treatment conditions; however, both patient groups also received
simultaneous treatment with intravenous cefotaxime (174 ).
Although an earlier meta-analysis indicated a trend toward decreased mortal-
ity in patients administered SDD (171 ), a more recent and more extensive
analysis highlights the equivocal effect of SDD on patient mortality, as well as
the high cost of using SDD to prevent nosocomial pneumonia or death result-
ing from nosocomial pneumonia (i.e., to prevent one case of nosocomial
pneumonia, six patients [range: five to nine patients] would have to be admin-
istered SDD; to prevent one death, 23 patients [range: 13–39 patients]) (178 ).
Furthermore, both the development of antimicrobial resistance and superin-
fection with gram-positive bacteria and other antibiotic-resistant nosocomial
pathogens are public health concerns (156,158,159,161,175,180 ). Thus, cur-
rently available data do not justify the routine use of SDD for prevention of
nosocomial pneumonia in ICU patients. SDD may be ultimately useful for spe-
cific subsets of ICU patients, such as patients with trauma or severe immuno-
suppression (e.g., bone-marrow–transplant recipients).
A new approach advocated to prevent oropharyngeal colonization in patients
receiving enteral nutrition is to reduce bacterial colonization of the stomach by
acidifying the enteral feed (181 ). Although the absence of bacteria from the
stomach has been confirmed in patients given acidified enteral feeding, the
effect on the incidence of nosocomial pneumonia has not been evaluated
(181 ) .
B. Aspiration of Oropharyngeal and Gastric Flora
Clinically important aspiration usually occurs in patients who a) have a de-
pressed level of consciousness; b) have dysphagia resulting from neurologic
or esophageal disorders; c) have an endotracheal (nasotracheal or orotra-
cheal), tracheostomal, or enteral (nasogastric or orogastric) tube in place;
and/or d) are receiving enteral feeding (35,84,85,182–186 ). Placement of an en-
teral tube may increase nasopharyngeal colonization, cause reflux of gastric
contents, or allow bacterial migration via the tube from the stomach to the
upper airway (183,186–188 ). When enteral feedings are administered, gross
contamination of the enteral solution during preparation (189–191 ) and ele-
vated gastric pH (70,192,193 ) may lead to gastric colonization with gram-
negative bacilli. In addition, gastric reflux and aspiration might occur because
of increased intragastric volume and pressure (70,117,183 ).
Although prevention of pneumonia in such patients may be difficult, methods
that make regurgitation less likely (e.g., placing the patient in a semirecumbent
position [i.e., by elevating the head of the bed] and withholding enteral feeding
if the residual volume in the stomach is large or if bowel sounds are not heard
upon auscultation of the abdomen) may be beneficial (185,194–197 ). Con-
versely, equivocal results have been obtained by a) administering enteral
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    *Resistant to at least one antimicrobial in the SDD regimen.
†





   **Clinical criteria included temperature >38 C, purulent bronchorrhea, WBC >(12,000–15,000/mm3). Radiologic criterion was evidence of new and
progressive infiltrate(s).
††
TS=tracheal secretions; PSB=protected-specimen brushing; BAL=bronchoalveolar lavage.
§§
Percentage of patients infected or colonized with gram-positive (GP) and/or gram-negative (GN) bacillary organisms at any body site; GP=percentage
of patients infected or colonized with gram-positive organisms at any body site; GN=percentage of patients infected or colonized with gram-negative
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Percentage of isolates; GP=percentage of gram-positive isolates; GN=percentage of gram-negative bacillary isolates.
§§§
Pn=pneumonia; TB=tracheobronchial infection; Br=bronchial infection.
¶¶¶
Control-A=patients given penicillin (ampicillin, piperacillin, or flucloxacillin) for clinical infection(s); Control-B=patients given cephalosporin (cephadrine,





However, at 4 weeks, the oropharyngeal cultures of 13% of SDD patients and 5% of control patients had methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA), and 41% of SDD patients and control patients were colonized with enterococci.
¶¶¶¶
Computed using data from 3,836 patients and 526 events, 260 in SDD patients and 366 in control patients.
***** CI=confidence interval.
†††††
However, bronchial colonization with MRSA occurred in 45% of SDD patients and 21% of control patients.
nutrition intermittently in small boluses rather than continuously (70,193 );
b) using flexible, small-bore enteral tubes (186,198 ); or c) placing the enteral
tube below the stomach (e.g., in the jejunum) (199,200 ).
C. Mechanically Assisted Ventilation and Endotracheal Intubation
Patients receiving continuous, mechanically assisted ventilation have 6–21
times the risk for acquiring nosocomial pneumonia compared with patients not
receiving ventilatory support (34,63,65,75 ). One study indicated that the risk
for developing ventilator-associated pneumonia increased by 1% per day (5 ).
This increased risk was attributed partially to carriage of oropharyngeal organ-
isms upon passage of the endotracheal tube into the trachea during intubation,
as well as to depressed host defenses secondary to the patient’s severe under-
lying illness (6,34,35,201 ). In addition, bacteria can aggregate on the surface of
the tube over time and form a glycocalyx (i.e., a biofilm) that protects the bac-
teria from the action of antimicrobial agents or host defenses (202 ). Some
researchers believe that these bacterial aggregates can become dislodged by
ventilation flow, tube manipulation, or suctioning and subsequently embolize
into the lower respiratory tract and cause focal pneumonia (203,204 ). Remov-
ing tracheal secretions by gentle suctioning and using aseptic techniques to
reduce cross-contamination to patients from contaminated respiratory therapy
equipment or contaminated or colonized hands of HCWs have been used tradi-
tionally to help prevent pneumonia in patients receiving mechanically assisted
ventilation.
The risk for pneumonia also is increased by the direct access of bacteria to the
lower respiratory tract, which often occurs because of leakage around the en-
dotracheal cuff (86,205 ), thus enabling pooled secretions above the cuff to
enter the trachea (206 ). In one study, the occurrence of nosocomial pneumonia
was delayed and decreased in intubated patients whose endotracheal tubes
had a separate dorsal lumen that allowed drainage (i.e., by suctioning) of se-
cretions in the space above the endotracheal tube cuff and below the glottis
(206 ). However, additional studies are needed to determine the cost-benefit
ratio of using this device.
D. Cross-Colonization Via Hands of HCWs
Pathogens that cause nosocomial pneumonia (e.g., gram-negative bacilli and
S. aureus) are ubiquitous in hospitals, especially in intensive- or critical-care
areas (207,208 ). Transmission of these microorganisms to patients frequently
occurs via an attending HCW’s hands that have become contaminated or tran-
siently colonized with the microorganisms (209–215 ). Procedures such as
tracheal suctioning and manipulation of the ventilator circuit or endotracheal
tubes increase the opportunity for cross-contamination (215,216 ). The risk for
cross-contamination can be reduced by using aseptic techniques and sterile or
disinfected equipment when appropriate (65 ) and by eliminating pathogens
from the hands of HCWs (65,215,217–219 ).
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In theory, adequate handwashing is an effective way of removing transient
bacteria from the hands (218,219 ); however, personnel compliance with hand-
washing recommendations has been generally poor (220–223 ). For this
reason, the routine use of gloves has been advocated to help prevent cross-
contamination (224,225 ). The routine use of gloves, in addition to the use of
gowns, was associated with a decrease in the incidence of nosocomial RSV
infection (226 ) and other infections acquired in ICUs (227 ). However, noso-
comial pathogens can colonize gloves (228 ), and outbreaks have been traced
to HCWs who did not change gloves after having contact with one patient and
before providing care to another (229,230 ). In addition, gloved hands can be
contaminated through leaks in the gloves (231 ).
E. Contamination of Devices Used on the Respiratory Tract
Devices used on the respiratory tract for respiratory therapy (e.g., nebulizers),
diagnostic examination (e.g., bronchoscopes and spirometers), and admini-
stration of anesthesia are potential reservoirs and vehicles for infectious
microorganisms (65,232–236 ). Routes of transmission might be from device to
patient (127,129,234–244 ), from one patient to another (245,246 ), or from one
body site to the lower respiratory tract of the same patient via hand or device
(233,246–248 ). Contaminated reservoirs of aerosol-producing devices (e.g.,
nebulizers) can allow the growth of hydrophilic bacteria that subsequently can
be aerosolized during use of the device (126,129,130,242 ). Gram-negative ba-
cilli (e.g., Pseudomonas sp., Xanthomonas sp., Flavobacterium sp., Legionella
sp., and nontuberculous mycobacteria) can multiply to substantial concentra-
tions in nebulizer fluid (241,249–251 ) and increase the risk for pneumonia in
patients using such devices (127–130,241,242,252,253 ).
Proper cleaning and sterilization or disinfection of reusable equipment are
important components of a program to reduce infections associated with res-
piratory therapy and anesthesia equipment (234,235,237–240,242,254–259 ).
Many devices or parts of devices used on the respiratory tract have been cate-
gorized as semicritical in the Spaulding classification system for appropriate
sterilization or disinfection of medical devices because they come into direct or
indirect contact with mucous membranes but do not ordinarily penetrate body
surfaces (Appendix A), and the associated risk for infection in patients after the
use of such devices is less than that associated with devices that penetrate
normally sterile tissues (260 ). Thus, if sterilization of these devices by steam
autoclave or ethylene oxide is not possible or cost-effective (261 ), they can be
subjected to high-level disinfection by pasteurization at 75 C for 30 minutes
(262–265 ) or by use of liquid chemical disinfectants approved by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) as sterilants/disinfectants and approved for
use on medical instruments by the Food and Drug Administration (225,
266–268 ).
If a respiratory device needs rinsing to remove a residual liquid chemical
sterilant/disinfectant after chemical disinfection, sterile water is preferred be-
cause tap or locally prepared distilled water might contain microorganisms
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that can cause pneumonia (249,250,269–272 ). In some hospitals, a tap-water
rinse followed by air-drying with or without an alcohol rinse (i.e., to hasten
drying) is used (273 ). In theory, if complete drying is achieved after a tap-water
rinse, the risk for nosocomial pneumonia associated with the use of the device
is probably low. Air drying reduces the level of microbial contamination of the
hands of HCWs after washing, and air drying also reduces contamination of
gastrointestinal endoscopes (274–276 ). However, many semicritical items
used on the respiratory tract (e.g., corrugated tubing, jet or ultrasonic nebuliz-
ers, and bronchoscopes) are difficult to dry, and the degree of dryness of a
device is difficult to assess (265 ). Data are insufficient regarding the safety of
routinely using tap water for rinsing (followed by drying) reusable semicritical
respiratory devices after their disinfection or between their uses on the same
patient (242,258,273,277 ).
1. Mechanical Ventilators, Breathing Circuits, Humidifiers, Heat-Moisture Ex-
changers, and In-Line Nebulizers 
a. Mechanical ventilators. The internal machinery of mechanical ventilators
used for respiratory therapy is not considered an important source of
bacterial contamination of inhaled gas (278 ). Thus, routine sterilization
or high-level disinfection of the internal machinery is considered unnec-
essary. Using high-efficiency bacterial filters at various positions in the
ventilator breathing circuit had been advocated previously (279,280 ). Fil-
ters interposed between the machinery and the main breathing circuit
can eliminate contaminants from the driving gas and prevent retrograde
contamination of the machine by the patient; however, these filters also
might alter the functional specifications of the breathing device by im-
peding high gas flows (279–281 ). Placement of a filter or condensate trap
at the expiratory-phase tubing of the mechanical-ventilator circuit may
help prevent cross-contamination of the ventilated patient’s immediate
environment (247,282 ), but the importance of such filters in preventing
nosocomial pneumonia needs further evaluation. 
b. Breathing circuits, humidifiers, and heat-moisture exchangers. In the
United States, most hospitals use ventilators with either bubble-through
or wick humidifiers that produce either insignificant (132,283 ) or no aero-
sols, respectively, for humidification. Thus, these devices probably do
not pose an important risk for pneumonia in patients. In addition, bubble-
through humidifiers are usually heated to temperatures that reduce or
eliminate bacterial pathogens (283,284 ). Sterile water, however, is still
usually used to fill these humidifiers (285 ) because tap or distilled water
might contain microorganisms, such as Legionella sp., that are more
heat-resistant than other bacteria (252,271 ).
The potential risk for pneumonia in patients using mechanical ventilators
that have heated bubble-through humidifiers stems primarily from the
condensate that forms in the inspiratory-phase tubing of the ventilator
circuit as a result of the difference in the temperatures of the inspiratory-
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phase gas and ambient air; condensate formation increases if the tubing
is unheated (286 ). The tubing and condensate can rapidly become con-
taminated, usually with bacteria that originate in the patient’s oropharynx
(286 ). In one study, 33% of inspiratory circuits were colonized with bacte-
ria via this route within 2 hours, and 80% within 24 hours, after initiation
of mechanical ventilation (286 ). Spillage of the contaminated conden-
sate into the patient’s tracheobronchial tree, as can occur during
procedures in which the tubing is moved (e.g., for suctioning, adjusting
the ventilator setting, or feeding or caring for the patient), may increase
the risk for pneumonia in the patient (286 ). Thus, in many hospitals,
HCWs are trained to prevent such spillage and to drain the fluid peri-
odically. Microorganisms contaminating ventilator-circuit condensate
can be transmitted to other patients via the hands of HCWs handling the
fluid, especially if the HCW neglects washing hands after handling the
condensate.
The role of ventilator-tubing changes in preventing pneumonia in pa-
tients using mechanical ventilators with bubble-through humidifiers has
been investigated. Initial studies of in-use contamination of mechanical
ventilator circuits with humidifiers have indicated that neither the rate of
bacterial contamination of inspiratory-phase gas nor the incidence of
pneumonia was significantly increased when tubing was changed every
24 hours rather than every 8 or 16 hours (287 ). A later study indicated
that changing the ventilator circuit every 48 hours rather than every
24 hours did not result in an increase in contamination of the inspiratory-
phase gas or tubing of the ventilator circuits (288 ). In addition, the
incidence of nosocomial pneumonia was not significantly higher when
circuits were changed every 48 hours rather than every 24 hours (288 ).
More recent reports suggest that the risk for pneumonia may not
increase when the interval for circuit change is prolonged beyond
48 hours. Another study indicated that the risk for pneumonia was not
significantly higher when the circuits were never changed for the dura-
tion of use by the patient (eight [29%] of 28 patients) rather than when the
circuits were changed every 48 hours (11 [31%] of 35 patients) (289 ).
These findings indicate that the recommended daily change in ventilator
circuits may be extended to ≥48 hours. This change in recommendation
could result in substantial savings for U.S. hospitals by reducing the
number of circuits used and the amount of personnel time required to
change the circuits (285,288 ). The maximum time, however, that a circuit
can be safely left unchanged on a patient has not been determined.
Condensate formation in the inspiratory-phase tubing of a ventilator
breathing circuit can be decreased by elevating the temperature of the
inspiratory-phase gas with a heated wire in the inspiratory-phase tubing.
However, in one report, three cases of endotracheal- or tracheostomy-
tube blockage by dried secretions of the patient were attributed to the
decrease in the relative humidity of inspired gas that resulted from the
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elevation of the gas temperature (290 ). Until additional information re-
garding the frequency of such cases is available, HCWs who provide care
to patients requiring mechanical ventilation should be aware of the ad-
vantages and potential complications associated with using heated
ventilator tubing.
Condensate formation can be eliminated by using a heat-moisture ex-
changer (HME) or a hygroscopic condenser humidifier (i.e., an “artificial
nose”) (291–296 ). An HME recycles heat and moisture exhaled by the
patient and eliminates the need for a humidifier. In the absence of a hu-
midifier, no condensate forms in the inspiratory-phase tubing of the
ventilator circuit. Thus, bacterial colonization of the tubing is prevented,
and the need to change the tubing on a periodic basis is obviated (216 ).
Some models of HMEs are equipped with bacterial filters, but the advan-
tage of using such filters is unknown. HMEs can increase the dead space
(i.e., the area of the lung in which air is not exchanged) and resistance to
breathing, might leak around the endotracheal tube, and might result in
drying of sputum and blockage of the tracheobronchial tree (297 ). Al-
though recently developed HMEs that have humidifiers increase airway
humidity without increasing colonization of bacteria (293,298 ), addi-
tional studies are needed to determine whether the incidence of pneu-
monia is decreased (299–302 ).
c. Small-volume (“in-line”) medication nebulizers. Small-volume medica-
tion nebulizers that are inserted in the inspiratory circuit of mechanical
ventilators can produce bacterial aerosols (242 ). If such devices become
contaminated by condensate in the inspiratory tubing of the breathing
circuit, they can increase the patient’s risk for pneumonia because the
nebulizer aerosol is directed through the endotracheal tube and bypasses
many of the normal host defenses against infection (286 ).
2. Large-Volume Nebulizers. Nebulizers with large-volume (>500 cc) reser-
voirs, including those used in intermittent positive-pressure breathing
(IPPB) machines and ultrasonic or spinning-disk room-air humidifiers, pose
the greatest risk for pneumonia to patients, probably because of the large
amount of aerosols they generate (237–241,252,303 ). These reservoirs can
become contaminated by the hands of HCWs, unsterile humidification fluid,
or inadequate sterilization or disinfection between uses (126 ). Once intro-
duced into the reservoir, various bacteria, including Legionella sp., can
multiply to sufficiently large numbers within 24 hours to pose a risk for
infection in patients who receive inhalation therapy (128,129,241,253,303 ).
Sterilization or high-level disinfection of these nebulizers can eliminate
vegetative bacteria from their reservoirs and make them safe for patient use
(260 ). However, unlike nebulizers attached to IPPB machines, room-air
humidifiers have a high cost-benefit ratio: evidence of clinical benefits from
their use in hospitals is lacking, and the potential cost of daily sterilization
or disinfection of, and use of sterile water to fill, such devices is substantial.
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3. Hand-Held Small-Volume Medication Nebulizers. Small-volume medication
nebulizers used to administer bronchodilators, including nebulizers that are
hand-held, can produce bacterial aerosols. Hand-held nebulizers have been
associated with nosocomial pneumonia, including Legionnaires disease,
resulting from either contamination with medications from multidose vials
(304 ) or Legionella-contaminated tap water used for rinsing and filling the
reservoir (258 ).
4. Suction Catheters, Resuscitation Bags, Oxygen Analyzers, and Ventilator
Spirometers. Tracheal suction catheters can introduce microorganisms into
a patient’s lower respiratory tract. Two types of suction-catheter systems
are used in U.S. hospitals: the open single-use catheter system and the
closed multi-use catheter system. Studies comparing the two systems have
involved low numbers of patients; the results of these studies suggest that
the risk for catheter contamination or pneumonia does not differ between
patients on whom the single-use suction method is used and those on
whom the closed multi-use catheter system is used (305–307 ). Although
advantages of cost and decreased environmental contamination have been
attributed to use of the closed-suction system (308,309 ), larger studies are
needed to compare the advantages and disadvantages of both systems
(310 ) .
Reusable resuscitation bags are particularly difficult to clean and dry be-
tween uses; microorganisms in secretions or fluid left in the bag may be
aerosolized and/or sprayed into the lower respiratory tract of the patient on
whom the bag is used; in addition, contaminating microorganisms might
be transmitted from one patient to another via hands of HCWs (311–313 ).
Oxygen analyzers and ventilator spirometers have been associated with
outbreaks of gram-negative respiratory tract colonization and pneumonia
resulting from patient-to-patient transmission of organisms via hands of
HCWs (233,245 ). These devices require either sterilization or high-level
disinfection between uses on different patients. Education of physicians,
respiratory therapists, and nursing staff regarding the associated risks and
appropriate care of these devices is essential. 
5. Anesthesia Equipment. The contributory role of anesthesia equipment in
outbreaks of nosocomial pneumonia was reported before hospitals imple-
mented routine after-use cleaning and disinfection/sterilization of reusable
anesthesia-equipment components that could become contaminated with
pathogens during use (314,315 ).
a. Anesthesia machine. The internal components of anesthesia machines,
which include the gas sources and outlets, gas valves, pressure regula-
tors, flowmeters, and vaporizers, are not considered an important source
of bacterial contamination of inhaled gases (316 ). Thus, routine steriliza-
tion or high-level disinfection of the internal machinery is unnecessary.
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b. Breathing system or patient circuit. The breathing system or patient cir-
cuit (including the tracheal tube or face mask, inspiratory and expiratory
tubing, y-piece, CO2 absorber and its chamber, anesthesia ventilator bel-
lows and tubing, humidifier, adjustable pressure-limiting valve, and other
devices and accessories), through which inhaled and/or exhaled gases
flow to and from a patient, can become contaminated with microorgan-
isms that might originate from the patient’s oropharynx or trachea.
Recommendations for in-use care, maintenance, and reprocessing (i.e.,
cleaning and disinfection or sterilization) of the components of the
breathing system have been published (317,318 ). In general, reusable
components of the breathing system that directly touch the patient’s mu-
cous membranes (e.g., face mask or tracheal tube) or become readily
contaminated with the patient’s respiratory secretions (e.g., y-piece, in-
spiratory and expiratory tubing, and attached sensors) are cleaned and
subjected to high-level disinfection or sterilization between patients. The
other parts of the breathing system (e.g., CO2 absorber and its chamber),
for which an appropriate and cost-effective schedule of reprocessing has
not been firmly determined (319 ), are changed, cleaned, and sterilized or
subjected to high-level disinfection periodically in accordance with pub-
lished guidelines (317,318 ) and/or the manufacturers’ instructions.
Using high-efficiency bacterial filters at various positions in the patient
circuit (e.g., at the y-piece or on the inspiratory and expiratory sides of
the patient circuit) has been advocated (317,320,321 ) and shown to de-
crease contamination of the circuit (321–323 ). However, the use of
bacterial filters to prevent nosocomial pulmonary infections has not been
proven to be effective and requires additional analysis (324–326 ).
6. Pulmonary Function Testing Apparatus.
a. Internal parts of pulmonary function testing apparatus. The internal parts
of pulmonary function testing apparatus usually are not considered an
important source of bacterial contamination of inhaled gas (327 ). How-
ever, because of concern about possible carry-over of bacterial aerosols
from an infectious patient-user of the apparatus to the next patient
(246,328 ), placement of bacterial filters (i.e., that remove exhaled bacte-
ria) between the patient and the testing equipment has been advocated
(246,329 ). More studies are needed to evaluate the need for and efficacy
of these filters in preventing nosocomial pneumonia (330 ).
b. Tubing, rebreathing valves, and mouthpieces. Tubing, connectors, re-
breathing valves, and mouthpieces could become contaminated with
patient secretions during use of the pulmonary function testing appara-
tus. Thus, these items should be cleaned and subjected to high-level
disinfection or sterilization between uses on different patients.
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F. Thoracoabdominal Surgical Procedures
Certain patients are at high risk for developing postoperative pulmonary
complications, including pneumonia. These persons include those who are
obese or are >70 years of age or who have chronic obstructive pulmonary dis-
ease (331–334 ). Abnormal results from pulmonary function tests (especially
decreased maximum expiration flow rate), a history of smoking, the presence
of tracheostomy or prolonged intubation, or protein depletion that can cause
respiratory-muscle weakness are also risk factors (62,68,136 ). Patients who
undergo surgery of the head, neck, thorax, or abdomen might have impair-
ment of normal swallowing and respiratory clearance mechanisms as a result
of instrumentation of the respiratory tract, anesthesia, or increased use of nar-
cotics and sedatives (332,335,336 ). Patients who undergo upper abdominal
surgery usually have diaphragmatic dysfunction that results in decreased func-
tional residual capacity of the lungs, closure of airways, and atelectasis
(337,338 ).
Interventions aimed at reducing the postoperative patient’s risk for pneumonia
have been developed (339 ). These include deep breathing exercises, chest
physiotherapy, use of incentive spirometry, IPPB, and continuous positive air-
way pressure by face mask (339–349 ). Studies evaluating the relative efficacy
of these modalities reported variable results and were difficult to compare be-
cause of differences in outcome variables assessed, patient populations
studied, and study design (339,341,342,348–350 ). Nevertheless, many studies
have reported that deep breathing exercises, use of incentive spirometry, and
IPPB are advantageous maneuvers, especially in patients who had preopera-
tive pulmonary dysfunction (342,343,345,346,348–350 ). In addition, control of
pain that interferes with cough and deep breathing during the immediate post-
operative period decreases the incidence of pulmonary complications after
surgery. Several methods of controlling pain have been used; these include
both intramuscular or intravenous (including patient-controlled) administra-
tion of analgesia and regional (e.g., epidural) analgesia (351–358 ).
G. Other Prophylactic Measures
1. Vaccination of Patients. Although pneumococci are not a major cause of
nosocomial pneumonia, these organisms have been identified as etiologic
agents of serious nosocomial pulmonary infection and bacteremia (359–
361 ) . The following factors place patients at high risk for complications
from pneumococcal infections: age ≥65 years of age, chronic cardiovascular
or pulmonary disease, diabetes mellitus, alcoholism, cirrhosis, cerebrospi-
nal fluid leaks, immunosuppression, functional or anatomic asplenia, or
infection with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Pneumococcal vaccine
is effective in preventing pneumococcal disease (362,363 ). Because two
thirds or more of patients with serious pneumococcal disease have been
hospitalized at least once within the 5 years preceding their pneumococcal
illness, offering pneumococcal vaccine in hospitals (e.g., at the time of
Vol. 46 / No. RR-1 MMWR 27
patient discharge) should contribute substantially to preventing the disease
(362,364 ).
2. Prophylaxis with Systemic Antimicrobial Agents. The systemic admin-
istration of antimicrobials is commonly used to prevent nosocomial pneu-
monia—especially for patients who are receiving mechanical ventilation,
are postoperative, and/or are critically ill (365–367 ). However, the efficacy
of this practice is questionable, and superinfection, which is possible as a
result of any antimicrobial therapy, could occur (74,91,366–371 ) .
3. Use of “Kinetic Beds” or Continuous Lateral Rotational Therapy (CLRT) for
Immobilized Patients. Use of kinetic beds, or CLRT, is a maneuver for
prevention of pulmonary and other complications resulting from prolonged
immobilization or bed rest, such as in patients with acute stroke, critical
illness, head injury or traction, blunt chest trauma, and/or mechanically
assisted ventilation (372–377 ). This procedure involves the use of a bed that
turns continuously and slowly (from ≤40º for CLRT to ≥40º for kinetic
therapy) along its longitudinal axis. Among the hypothesized benefits are
improved drainage of secretions within the lungs and lower airways, in-
creased tidal volume, and reduction of venous thrombosis with resultant
pulmonary embolization (378–381 ). However, the efficacy of CLRT in pre-
venting pneumonia needs further evaluation because studies have yielded
variable results (372–376 ). In addition, the studies either involved small
numbers of patients (373 ), lacked adequate randomization (372 ), had no
clear definition of pneumonia (372 ), did not distinguish between commu-
nity-acquired and nosocomial pneumonia (373,377 ), or did not adjust for
possible confounding factors (e.g., mechanical ventilation, endotracheal
intubation, nasogastric intubation, and enteral feeding) (372 ) .
LEGIONNAIRES DISEASE
 I. Epidemiology
Legionnaires disease is a multisystem illness, with pneumonia, caused by Legion-
ella sp. (382 ). Since the etiologic agent of Legionnaires disease was identified,
numerous nosocomial outbreaks of the disease have been reported, thus ena-
bling researchers to study the epidemiology of epidemic legionellosis. In contrast,
the epidemiology of sporadic (i.e., nonoutbreak-related) nosocomial Legionnaires
disease has not been well defined. However, when one case is identified, the pres-
ence of additional cases should be suspected. Of 196 cases of nosocomial
Legionnaires disease reported in England and Wales during 1980–1992, 69% oc-
curred during 22 nosocomial outbreaks (defined as two or more cases occurring
at a hospital during a 6-month period) (383 ). Nine percent of cases occurred
>6 months before or after a hospital outbreak, and another 13% occurred in hos-
pitals in which other sporadic cases, but no outbreaks, were identified. Only 9%
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occurred at institutions in which no outbreaks or additional sporadic cases were
identified.
In North America, the overall proportion of nosocomial pneumonias caused by
Legionella sp. has not been determined, although the reported proportions from
individual hospitals have ranged from zero to 14% (384–386 ). Because diagnostic
tests for Legionella sp. infection are not performed routinely on all patients who
have hospital-acquired pneumonia in most U.S. hospitals, this range probably un-
derestimates the incidence of Legionnaires disease.
Legionella sp. are commonly found in various natural and man-made aquatic
environments (387,388 ) and may enter hospital water systems in low or unde-
tectable numbers (389,390 ). Cooling towers, evaporative condensers, heated
potable-water–distribution systems within hospitals, and locally produced dis-
tilled water can provide a suitable environment for legionellae to multiply. Factors
known to enhance colonization and amplification of legionellae in man-made
water environments include temperatures of 25–42 C (391–395 ), stagnation
(396 ) , scale and sediment (392 ), and the presence of certain free-living aquatic
amoebae that are capable of supporting intracellular growth of legionellae
(397,398 ).
A person’s risk for acquiring legionellosis after exposure to contaminated water
depends on a number of factors, including the type and intensity of exposure and
the person’s health status (399–401 ). Persons who are severely immunosup-
pressed or who have chronic underlying illnesses, such as hematologic
malignancy or end-stage renal disease, are at a markedly increased risk for
legionellosis (401–404 ). Persons in the later stages of acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome (AIDS) also are probably at increased risk for legionellosis, but data are
limited because of infrequent testing of patients (401 ). Persons who have diabe-
tes mellitus, chronic lung disease, or nonhematologic malignancy; those who
smoke cigarettes; and the elderly are at moderately increased risk (382 ). Noso-
comial Legionnaires disease also has been reported among patients in pediatric
hospitals (405,406 ).
Underlying disease and advanced age are risk factors not only for acquiring
Legionnaires disease but also for dying as a result of the illness. In a multivariate
analysis of 3,524 cases reported to CDC from 1980 through 1989, immunosup-
pression, advanced age, end-stage renal disease, cancer, and nosocomial
acquisition of disease were each independently associated with a fatal outcome
(401 ). The mortality rate was 40% among 803 persons who had nosocomially
acquired cases, compared with 20% among 2,721 persons who had community-
acquired cases (401 ); this difference probably reflected the increased severity of
underlying disease in hospitalized patients.
 II. Diagnosis
The clinical spectrum of disease caused by Legionella sp. is broad and ranges
from asymptomatic infection to rapidly progressive pneumonia. Legionnaires
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disease cannot be distinguished clinically or radiographically from pneumonia
caused by other agents (407,408 ), and evidence of infection with other respira-
tory pathogens does not exclude the possibility of concomitant Legionella sp.
infection (409–411 ).
The diagnosis of legionellosis may be confirmed by any one of the following:
culture isolation of Legionella from respiratory secretions or tissues, microscopic
visualization of the bacterium in respiratory secretions or tissue by immunofluo-
rescent microscopy, or, for legionellosis caused by Legionella pneumophila
serogroup 1, detection of L. pneumophila serogroup-1 antigens in urine by
radioimmunoassay, or observation of a four-fold rise in L. pneumophila sero-
group-1 antibody titer to ≥1:128 in paired acute and convalescent serum
specimens by use of an indirect immunofluorescent antibody (IFA) test (412,413 ).
A single elevated antibody titer does not confirm a case of Legionnaires disease
because IFA titers ≥1:256 are found in 1%–16% of healthy adults (410,414–417 ).
Because the above tests complement each other, performing each test when
Legionnaires disease is suspected increases the probability of confirming the di-
agnosis (418 ). However, because none of the laboratory tests is 100% sensitive,
the diagnosis of legionellosis is not excluded even if one or more of the tests are
negative (413,418 ). Of the available tests, the most specific is culture isolation of
Legionella sp. from any respiratory tract specimen (419,420 ).
III. Modes of Transmission
Inhalation of aerosols of water contaminated with Legionella sp. might be the pri-
mary mechanism by which these organisms enter a patient’s respiratory tract
(382 ). In several hospital outbreaks, patients were considered to be infected
through exposure to contaminated aerosols generated by cooling towers, show-
ers, faucets, respiratory therapy equipment, and room-air humidifiers (11,241,258,
421–427 ). In other studies, aspiration of contaminated potable water or pharyn-
geal colonizers was proposed as the mode of transmission to certain patients
(425,428–430 ). However, person-to-person transmission has not been observed.
IV. Definition of Nosocomial Legionnaires Disease
The incubation period for Legionnaires disease is usually 2–10 days (431 ); thus,
for the purposes of this document and the accompanying HICPAC recommenda-
tions, laboratory-confirmed legionellosis that occurs in a patient who has been
hospitalized continuously for ≥10 days before the onset of illness is considered a
definite case of nosocomial Legionnaires disease, and laboratory-confirmed
infection that occurs 2–9 days after hospital admission is a possible case of the
disease.
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 V. Prevention and Control Measures
A. Prevention of Legionnaires Disease in Hospitals with No Identified Cases
(Primary Prevention)
Prevention strategies in health-care facilities in which no cases of nosocomial
legionellosis have been identified have differed depending on the immu-
nologic status of the patients, the design and construction of the facility, the
resources available for implementing prevention strategies, and state and local
regulations.
At least two strategies are practiced with regard to the most appropriate and
cost-effective means of preventing nosocomial legionellosis, especially in hos-
pitals in which no cases or only sporadic cases of the illness have been
detected. However, a study comparing the cost-benefit ratios of these strate-
gies has not been conducted.
The first approach is based on periodic, routine culturing of water samples
from the hospital’s potable water system for the purpose of detecting
Legionella sp. (432,433 ). When ≥30% of the samples obtained are culture-
positive for Legionella sp., the hospital’s potable water system is decontami-
nated (433 ), and diagnostic laboratory tests for legionellosis are made
available to clinicians in the hospital’s microbiology department so that active
surveillance for cases can be implemented (433,434 ). This approach is based
on the premise that no cases of nosocomial legionellosis can occur if
Legionella sp. is not present in the potable water system, and, conversely, if
Legionella sp. are cultured from the water, cases of nosocomial legionellosis
could occur (428,435 ). Proponents of this strategy indicate that when physi-
cians are informed that the potable water system of the hospital is
culture-positive for Legionella sp., they are more inclined to conduct the neces-
sary tests for legionellosis (434 ). A potential advantage of using this approach
in hospitals in which no cases of nosocomial legionellosis have occurred is that
routinely culturing a limited number of water samples is less costly than rou-
tinely performing laboratory diagnostic testing for all patients who have
nosocomial pneumonia.
The main argument against this approach is that, in the absence of cases, the
relationship between the results of water cultures and the risk for legionellosis
remains undefined. The bacterium has been frequently present in water sys-
tems of buildings (436 ), often without being associated with known cases of
disease (271,385,437,438 ). In a study of 84 hospitals in Quebec, 68% of the
water systems were found to be colonized with Legionella sp., and 26% were
colonized at >30% of sites sampled; however, cases of Legionnaires disease
were reported rarely from these hospitals (271 ). Similarly, at one hospital in
which active surveillance for legionellosis and environmental culturing for
Legionella sp. were done, no cases of legionellosis occurred in a urology ward
during a 3.5-month period when 70% of water samples from the ward were
culture-positive for L. pneumophila serogroup 1 (385 ). Interpretation of the
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results of routinely culturing the water might be confounded by differing re-
sults among the sites sampled within a single water system and by fluctuations
in the concentration of Legionella sp. at the same site (439,440 ). In addition,
the risk for illness after exposure to a given source might be influenced by a
number of factors other than the presence or concentration of organisms;
these factors include the degree to which contaminated water is aerosolized
into respirable droplets, the proximity of the infectious aerosol to the potential
host, the susceptibility of the host, and the virulence properties of the contami-
nating strain (441–443 ). Thus, data are insufficient to assign a level of risk for
disease even on the basis of the number of colony-forming units detected in
samples from the hospital environment. By routinely culturing water samples,
many hospital administrators will have to initiate water-decontamination pro-
grams if Legionella sp. are identified. Because of this problem, routine
monitoring of water from the hospital’s potable water system and from
aerosol-producing devices is not widely recommended (444 ). 
The second approach to preventing and controlling nosocomial legionellosis
involves a) maintaining a high index of suspicion for legionellosis and appro-
priately using diagnostic tests for legionellosis in patients who have noso-
comial pneumonia and who are at high risk for developing the disease and
dying from the infection (385,445 ), b) initiating an investigation for a hospital
source of Legionella sp. upon identification of one case of definite or two cases
of possible nosocomial Legionnaires disease, and c) routinely maintaining
cooling towers and using only sterile water for the filling and terminal rinsing
of nebulization devices.
Measures used in hospitals in which cases of nosocomial legionellosis have
been identified include either a) routine maintenance of potable water at ≥50 C
or <20 C at the tap or b) chlorination of heated water to achieve 1–2 mg/L of
free residual chlorine at the tap, especially in areas where immunosuppressed
and other high-risk patients are located (385,428,439,446–449 ). However, the
cost-benefit ratio of such measures in hospitals in which no cases of legionel-
losis have been identified needs additional evaluation.
B. Prevention of Legionnaires Disease in Hospitals with Identified Cases
(Secondary Prevention)
The indications for a full-scale environmental investigation to search for and
subsequently decontaminate identified sources of Legionella sp. in hospital en-
vironments have not been clarified, and these indications probably differ
depending on the hospital. In hospitals in which as few as one to three noso-
comial cases are identified during a period of several months, intensified
surveillance for Legionnaires disease has frequently identified numerous addi-
tional cases (403,422,425,447 ). This finding suggests the need for a low
threshold for initiating an investigation after laboratory confirmation of cases
of nosocomial legionellosis. However, when developing a strategy for re-
sponding to such an identification, infection-control personnel should consider
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the level of risk for nosocomial acquisition of, and mortality from, Legionella
sp. infection at their particular hospital.
An epidemiologic investigation conducted to determine the source of
Legionella sp. involves several important steps. First, microbiologic and medi-
cal records should be reviewed. Second, active surveillance should be initiated
to identify all recent or ongoing cases of legionellosis. Third, potential risk fac-
tors for infection (including environmental exposures such as showering or
use of respiratory-therapy equipment) should be identified by creating a line
listing of cases, analyzing the collected information (by time, place, and per-
son), and comparing case-patients with appropriate controls. Fourth, water
samples should be collected from environmental sources implicated by the
epidemiologic investigation and from other potential sources of aerosolized
water. Fifth, subtype-matching between legionellae isolated from patients and
environmental samples should be conducted (427,450–452 ). This last step can
be crucial in supporting epidemiologic evidence of a link between human ill-
ness and a specific source (453 ).
In some hospitals in which the heated-water system was identified as the
source of the organism, the system was decontaminated by pulse (one-time)
thermal disinfection or superheating (i.e., flushing each distal outlet of the hot-
water system for at least 5 minutes with water at ≥65 C) and hyperchlorination
(flushing all outlets of the hot-water system with water containing ≥10 mg/L of
free residual chlorine) (449,454–456 ). After either of these procedures, most
hospitals either a) maintain heated water at ≥50 C or <20 C at the tap or b) chlo-
rinate heated water to achieve 1–2 mg/L of free residual chlorine at the tap
(385,428,439,446–449 ). Additional measures (e.g., physical cleaning or re-
placement of hot-water storage tanks, water-heaters, faucets, and shower-
heads) may be required because scale and sediment might accumulate in this
equipment and protect organisms from the biocidal effects of heat and chlo-
rine (392,449 ). Alternative methods for controlling and eradicating legionellae
in water systems (e.g., treating water with ozone, ultraviolet light, or heavy
metal ions) have limited the growth of legionellae under laboratory and/or op-
erating conditions (457–462 ). However, additional data are needed regarding
the efficacy of these methods before they can be considered standard precau-
tions. Measures for decontaminating hospital cooling towers have been
published previously (463 ).
Additional preventive measures have been used to protect severely immuno-
compromised patients. At one hospital, immunosuppressed patients were
restricted from taking showers, and, for these patients, only sterile water was
used for drinking or flushing nasogastric tubes (429 ). In another hospital, a
combined approach consisting of continuous heating, particulate filtration, ul-
traviolet treatment, and monthly pulse hyperchlorination of the water supply
to the bone-marrow transplant unit was used to decrease the incidence of
Legionnaires disease (458 ).
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The decision to search for hospital environmental sources of Legionella sp. and
the choice of procedures to use to eradicate such contamination should take
into account the type of patient population served by the hospital. Further-
more, decision makers should consider a) the high cost of an environmental
investigation and of instituting control measures to eradicate Legionella sp.
from sources in the hospital (464,465 ) and b) the differential risk, based on
host factors, for acquiring nosocomial legionellosis and of having severe and
fatal infection with the microorganism.
ASPERGILLOSIS
 I. Epidemiology
Aspergillus sp. are ubiquitous fungi that commonly occur in soil, water, and
decaying vegetation. Aspergillus sp. have been cultured from unfiltered air, venti-
lation systems, contaminated dust dislodged during hospital renovation and
construction, horizontal surfaces, food, and ornamental plants (466 ).
Aspergillus fumigatus and Aspergillus flavus are the most frequently isolated
Aspergillus sp. in patients who have laboratory-confirmed aspergillosis (467 ).
Nosocomial aspergillosis has been recognized increasingly as a cause of severe
illness and mortality in highly immunocompromised patients (e.g., patients un-
dergoing chemotherapy and/or organ transplantation, including bone-marrow
transplantation for hematologic and other malignant neoplasms) (468–472 ).
The most important nosocomial infection caused by Aspergillus sp. is pneumonia
(473,474 ). Hospital outbreaks of pulmonary aspergillosis have occurred primarily
in granulocytopenic patients, especially those in bone-marrow transplant units
(473–480 ). Although invasive aspergillosis has been reported in recipients of
solid-organ (e.g., heart and kidney) transplants (481–485 ), the incidence of Asper-
gillus sp. infections in these patients has been lower than in recipients of
bone-marrow transplants, probably because granulocytopenia is less severe in
solid-organ transplant recipients and the use of corticosteroids, especially in kid-
ney transplant recipients, has decreased with the introduction of cyclosporine
(483,486 ). The efficacy of infection-control measures, such as provision of pro-
tected environments and prophylaxis with antifungal agents, in preventing
aspergillosis in solid-organ transplant recipients has not been well evaluated
(483,484,486,487 ). In one study of heart-transplant recipients, using only protec-
tive isolation of patients did not prevent fungal infections (488 ). 
The reported attributable mortality from invasive pulmonary aspergillosis has dif-
fered depending on the patient population studied. Rates have been as high as
95% in recipients of allogeneic bone-marrow transplants and patients who have
aplastic anemia, compared with rates of 13%–80% in leukemic patients (489–491 ) .
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 II. Pathogenesis
In contrast to most bacterial pneumonias, the primary route of acquiring Aspergil-
lus sp. infection is by inhalation of the fungal spores. In severely immuno-
compromised patients, primary Aspergillus sp. pneumonia results from invasion
of local lung tissue (467,474,492 ). Subsequently, the fungus might disseminate
via the bloodstream to involve multiple other deep organs (467,474,493 ). A role
for nasopharyngeal colonization with Aspergillus sp., as an intermediate step be-
fore invasive pulmonary disease, has been proposed but remains to be elucidated
(494–496 ). Conversely, colonization of the lower respiratory tract by Aspergillus
sp. has predisposed patients, especially those with preexisting lung disease (e.g.,
chronic obstructive lung disease, cystic fibrosis, or inactive tuberculosis), to inva-
sive pulmonary and/or disseminated infection (467,474,497 ).
III. Diagnosis
Diagnosing pneumonia caused by Aspergillus sp. is often difficult without per-
forming invasive procedures. Although bronchoalveolar lavage has been a useful
screening test (498–500 ), lung biopsy is still considered the most reliable tech-
nique (501 ). Histopathologic demonstration of tissue invasion by fungal hyphae
has been required in addition to isolation of Aspergillus sp. from respiratory tract
secretions because the latter, by itself, may indicate colonization (502 ). However,
when Aspergillus sp. is grown from the sputum of a febrile, granulocytopenic pa-
tient who has a new pulmonary infiltrate, it is highly likely that the patient has
pulmonary aspergillosis (495,503 ). Routine blood cultures are remarkably insen-
sitive for detecting Aspergillus sp. (504 ), and systemic antibody responses in
immunocompromised patients are probably unreliable indicators of infection
(505–507 ). Antigen-based serologic assays are being developed in an attempt to
allow for the rapid and specific diagnosis of Aspergillus sp. infections; however,
the clinical usefulness of such assays has not been determined (508,509 ).
IV. Risk Factors and Control Measures
The primary risk factor for invasive aspergillosis is severe and prolonged granulo-
cytopenia, both disease- and therapy-induced (510 ). Because bone-marrow–
transplant recipients experience the most severe degree of granulocytopenia,
they probably constitute the population at highest risk for developing invasive
aspergillosis (490,511 ). The tendency of bone-marrow–transplant recipients to
contract severe granulocytopenia (i.e., <1,000 polymorphonuclears/µL) is associ-
ated with the type of graft they receive. Although both autologous and allogeneic
bone-marrow–transplant recipients are severely granulocytopenic for up to
4 weeks after the transplant procedure, acute or chronic graft-versus-host disease
also could develop in allogeneic-transplant recipients. The latter might occur up
to several months after the procedure, and the disease and/or its therapy (which
often includes high doses of corticosteroids, cyclosporine, and other immunosup-
pressive agents) might result in severe granulocytopenia. Consequently, in
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developing strategies to prevent invasive Aspergillus sp. infection in bone-
marrow–transplant recipients, infection-control personnel should consider expo-
sures of the patient to the fungus both during and subsequent to the immediate
post-transplantation period. After hospital discharge, patients (especially
allogeneic-transplant recipients) might continue to manifest severe granulocy-
topenia and, therefore, are susceptible to fungal exposures at home and in
ambulatory-care settings. To help address the problem of invasive aspergillosis in
bone-marrow–transplant recipients, various studies are in progress to evaluate
newer methods of a) enhancing host resistance to invasive fungal (and other) in-
fections and b) eliminating or suppressing respiratory fungal colonization of the
upper respiratory tract. These methods include, respectively, the use of granulo-
cyte-colony–stimulating factors and intranasal application of amphotericin B or
oral or systemic antifungal drug prophylaxis (466,512–515 ). For solid-organ trans-
plant recipients, risk factors for invasive aspergillosis have not been studied as
extensively. In one study of liver-transplant recipients, risk factors for invasive in-
fection with Aspergillus sp. included preoperative and postoperative receipt of
steroids and antimicrobial agents and prolonged duration of transplant surgery
(516 ).
The presence of aspergilli in the hospital environment is the most important ex-
trinsic risk factor for opportunistic invasive Aspergillus sp. infection (517,518 ).
Environmental disturbances caused by construction and/or renovation activities
in and around hospitals markedly increase the airborne Aspergillus sp. spore
counts in such hospitals and have been associated with nosocomial aspergillosis
(476,478,479,519–522 ). Aspergillosis in immunosuppressed patients also has
been associated with other hospital environmental reservoirs. Such reservoirs in-
clude contaminated fireproofing material, damp wood, and bird droppings in air
ducts (478,523,524 ).
A single case of nosocomial Aspergillus sp. pneumonia is often difficult to link to
a specific environmental exposure. However, additional cases may remain unde-
tected without an active search that includes an intensive retrospective review of
microbiologic, histopathologic, and postmortem records; notification of clinicians
caring for high-risk patients; and establishment of a system for prospective sur-
veillance for additional cases. When additional cases are detected, the likelihood
is increased that a hospital environmental source of Aspergillus sp. can be identi-
fied (476,478,519–524 ). Previous investigations have demonstrated the impor-
tance of construction activities and/or fungal contamination of hospital air-
handling systems as major sources for outbreaks (473,476,478,519–523 ). New
molecular typing techniques (i.e., karyotyping [525 ] and DNA endonuclease pro-
filing, which is now available for A. fumigatus [526 ]) may substantially aid in
identifying the source of an outbreak.
Outbreaks of invasive aspergillosis reinforce the importance of maintaining an
environment as free as possible of Aspergillus sp. spores for patients who have
severe granulocytopenia. To achieve this goal, specialized services in many large
hospitals—particularly bone-marrow transplant services—have installed “pro-
tected environments” for the care of their high-risk, severely granulocytopenic
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patients and have increased their vigilance during hospital construction and rou-
tine maintenance of hospital air-filtration and ventilation systems to prevent
exposing high-risk patients to bursts of fungal spores (476,478,519–523,527–532 ).
Although the exact configuration and specifications of the protected environ-
ments might differ between hospitals, such patient-care areas are built to
minimize fungal spore counts in air by maintaining a) filtration of incoming air by
using central or point-of-use high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters that are
capable of removing 99.97% of particles ≥0.3 µm in diameter; b) directed room
airflow (i.e., from intake on one side of the room, across the patient, and out
through the exhaust on the opposite side of the room); c) positive room-air pres-
sure relative to the corridor; d) well-sealed rooms; and e) high rates of room-air
changes (range: 15 to >400 per hour), although air-change rates at the higher lev-
els might pose problems of patient comfort (473,528–530,532–534 ). The oldest
and most studied protected environment is a room with laminar airflow. Such an
environment consists of a bank of HEPA filters along an entire wall of the room;
air is pumped by blowers through these filters and into the room at a uniform
velocity (90 ± 20 feet/minute), forcing the air to move in a laminar, or at least uni-
directional, pattern (535 ). The air usually exits at the opposite end of the room,
and ultra-high air-change rates (i.e., 100–400 air changes per hour) are achieved
(473,527 ). The net effects are essentially sterile air in the room, minimal air turbu-
lence, minimal opportunity for microorganism build-up, and a consistently clean
environment (473 ).
The laminar-airflow system is effective in decreasing or eliminating the risk for
nosocomial aspergillosis in high-risk patients (473,528,532,534 ). However, such a
system is costly to install and maintain. Less expensive alternative systems with
lower air-change rates (i.e., 10–15 air changes per hour) have been used in some
hospitals (529,530,536 ). However, studies comparing the efficacy of these alterna-
tive systems with laminar-airflow rooms in eliminating Aspergillus sp. spores and
preventing nosocomial aspergillosis are limited. One hospital that employed
cross-flow ventilation, point-of-use HEPA filters, and 15 air changes per hour re-
ported that cases of nosocomial aspergillosis had occurred in patients housed in
these rooms, although this rate was low (i.e., 3.4%) (530,536 ). However, these
infections had been caused by A. flavus, a species that was not cultured from the
room air, suggesting that the patients were probably exposed to fungal spores
when they were allowed outside their rooms (530 ).
Copper-8-quinolinolate was used on environmental surfaces contaminated with
Aspergillus sp. to control one reported outbreak of aspergillosis (537 ), and it has
been incorporated in the fireproofing material of a newly constructed hospital to
help decrease the environmental spore burden (530 ); however, its general appli-
cability has not been established.
VIRAL PNEUMONIAS
Viruses can be an important and often unappreciated cause of nosocomial pneumonia
(538–540 ). In one prospective study of endemic nosocomial infections, approximately
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20% of pneumonia cases resulted from viral infections (539 ). Although the early diag-
nosis and treatment of viral pneumonia infections have been possible in recent years
(541–544 ), many hospitalized patients remain at high risk for developing severe and
sometimes fatal viral pneumonia (538,545–552 ). These data and reports of well-
documented outbreaks involving nosocomial viral transmission (553–556 ) indicate
that measures to prevent viral transmission should be instituted.
Nosocomial respiratory viral infections a) usually follow community outbreaks that
occur during a particular period every year (555,557–560 ), b) confer only short-term
immunity (561 ), c) affect both healthy and ill persons (547,548,554,562–564 ), and
d) have exogenous sources. A number of viruses—including adenoviruses, influenza
virus, measles virus, parainfluenza viruses, RSV, rhinoviruses, and varicella-zoster
virus—can cause nosocomial pneumonia (548,555,556,565–571,572 ); however, ade-
noviruses, influenza viruses, parainfluenza viruses, and RSV reportedly have
accounted for most (70%) nosocomial pneumonias caused by viruses (573 ).
Influenza and RSV infections contribute substantially to the morbidity and mortality
associated with viral pneumonia, and the epidemiology of both viral infections has
been well researched; for these reasons, this section concerning viral pneumonias
focuses on the principles of, and approaches to, the control of these two types of in-
fection. Recommendations for preventing nosocomial pneumonia caused by infection
with other viral pathogens were published previously (224 ).
RSV INFECTION
 I. Epidemiology
RSV infection is most common during infancy and early childhood, but it can also
occur in adults (562,565,574,575 ). Infection usually causes mild or moderately se-
vere upper respiratory illness. However, both life-threatening pneumonia and
bronchiolitis have occurred in immunocompromised patients, the elderly, and
children who have chronic cardiac and pulmonary disease (547,549,564,565,
576,577 ).
Recent surveillance of 10 U.S. hospital laboratories in which cultures for RSV are
performed suggests that community outbreaks occur on a seasonal basis from
December through March; these outbreaks last 3–5 months and are associated
with an increased number of hospitalizations and deaths among infants and
young children (578 ). During community outbreaks of RSV, children who have
respiratory symptoms at the time of hospital admission are often reservoirs for
RSV (553,555 ).
 II. Diagnosis
The clinical characteristics of RSV infection, especially in neonates, are often in-
distinguishable from those of other viral respiratory tract infections (565,566 ).
Culture of RSV from respiratory secretions is the standard for diagnosis. Rapid
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antigen-detection kits that use direct immunofluorescence or enzyme-linked im-
munosorbent assays can provide results within hours. The benefit of using these
tests to identify infected patients depends on the sensitivity and specificity of the
test. The reported sensitivity and specificity of RSV enzyme immunoassays vary
between 80% and 95% and may be even lower in actual practice (579–582 ). In
general, once laboratory-confirmed cases of RSV infection are identified in a
hospital, a presumptive diagnosis of RSV infection in subsequent cases with
manifestations suggestive of RSV infection may be acceptable for infection-
control purposes.
III. Modes of Transmission
RSV is present in large numbers in the respiratory secretions of symptomatic per-
sons infected with the virus, and it can be transmitted directly via large droplets
during close contact with such persons or indirectly via RSV-contaminated hands
or fomites (553,583,584 ). The portal of entry is usually the conjunctiva or the na-
sal mucosa (585 ). Inoculation by RSV-contaminated hands is the usual way of
depositing the virus onto the eyes or nose (553,583–585 ). Hands can become con-
taminated by handling either the respiratory secretions of infected persons or
contaminated fomites (583,584 ).
In nosocomial RSV outbreaks for which the viral isolates were typed, more than
one strain of RSV often was identified (554,563,586 ), suggesting multiple sources
of the virus. Potential sources include patients, HCWs, and visitors. Because in-
fected infants shed large amounts of virus in their respiratory secretions and can
easily contaminate their immediate surroundings, they are a major reservoir for
RSV (587 ). HCWs might become infected after exposure in the community (588 )
or in the hospital and subsequently transmit infection to patients, other HCWs, or
visitors (566,589 ).
IV. Control Measures
Different combinations of control measures, ranging from the simple to the com-
plex, have been effective in varying degrees in preventing and controlling
nosocomial RSV infection (226,589–596 ). Successful programs have shared two
common elements: implementation of contact-isolation precautions and compli-
ance with these precautions by HCWs. In theory, strict compliance with hand-
washing recommendations could prevent most nosocomial RSV infections; how-
ever, studies have indicated that such compliance among HCWs is poor
(221,222 ). Thus, other preventive measures are usually necessary to prevent RSV
infection.
The wearing of gloves and gowns has been associated with decreased incidence
of nosocomial RSV (226 ). The wearing of gloves has helped decrease transmis-
sion of RSV, probably because the gloves remind HCWs to comply with hand-
washing and other precautions and deter them from touching their eyes or nose.
However, the benefits derived from wearing gloves are offset if the gloves are not
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changed after contact with an infected patient or with contaminated fomites and
if hands are not washed adequately after glove removal (229 ). The wearing of
both gloves and gowns during contact with RSV-infected infants or their immedi-
ate environment has been successful in preventing infection (226 ). In addition,
the use of eye-nose goggles rather than masks has protected HCWs from infec-
tion; however, eye-nose goggles are not widely available and are inconvenient to
wear (593,597 ).
Additional measures may be indicated to control ongoing nosocomial transmis-
sion of RSV or to prevent transmission to patients at high risk for serious
complications resulting from the infection (e.g., patients whose cardiac, pulmo-
nary, or immune systems are compromised). The following additional control
measures have been used in various combinations: a) using private rooms for
infected patients OR cohorting infected patients, with or without preadmission
screening by rapid laboratory diagnostic tests; b) cohorting HCWs; c) excluding
HCWs who have symptoms of upper respiratory tract infection from caring for
uninfected patients at high risk for severe or fatal RSV infection (e.g., infants);
d) limiting visitors; and e) postponing admission of patients at high risk for com-
plications from RSV infection (224,590,592,594,596 ). Although the exact role of




Pneumonia that occurs in patients who have influenza can be caused by the influ-
enza virus, a secondary bacterial infection, or a combination of both (598–600 ).
Influenza-associated pneumonia can occur in any person but is more common in
infants and young children, in persons >65 years of age, and in persons of any age
who are immunosuppressed or have certain chronic medical conditions (e.g., se-
vere underlying heart or lung disease) (575,601–603 ).
Influenza typically occurs on a seasonal basis during December–April; during this
period, peak influenza activity in an affected community usually lasts 6–8 weeks
(604,605 ). Nosocomial outbreaks can occur in a community affected by an influ-
enza epidemic; these outbreaks are often characterized by abrupt onset and rapid
transmission (606–608 ). Most reported institutional outbreaks of influenza have
occurred in nursing homes; however, hospital outbreaks in pediatric and chronic-
care wards and in medical and neonatal intensive-care units have been reported
(556,609–612 ).
Influenza is believed to be spread from person to person by a) direct inhalation of
droplet nuclei or small-particle aerosols or b) direct deposition of virus-laden
large droplets onto the mucosal surfaces of the upper respiratory tract of a person
during close contact with an infected person (613–616 ). The extent to which
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transmission might occur by contact with virus-contaminated hands or fomites is
unknown; however, such contact is not the primary mode of transmission (617 ).
The most important reservoirs of influenza virus are infected persons. Although
the period of greatest communicability is during the first 3 days of illness, the
virus can be shed both before the onset of symptoms and for ≥7 days afterward
(556,604,618 ).
 II. Diagnosis
Influenza is clinically indistinguishable from other febrile respiratory illnesses;
however, during outbreaks with laboratory-confirmed cases, a presumptive diag-
nosis of the infection can be made for illnesses that have similar manifestations
(619 ). Historically, diagnosis of influenza was made by virus isolation from naso-
pharyngeal secretions or by serologic conversion, but recently developed rapid
diagnostic tests that are similar to culture in sensitivity and specificity now enable
early diagnosis and treatment of cases and provide a basis for prompt initiation of
antiviral prophylaxis as part of outbreak control (620–625 ).
III. Prevention and Control of Influenza
The most effective measure for reducing the impact of influenza is the vaccination
of persons at high risk for complications of the infection before the influenza
season begins each year. High-risk persons include persons 6 months–18 years of
age who are receiving long-term aspirin therapy and persons who either a) are
≥65 years of age; b) are in long-term–care units; or c) have either chronic disor-
ders of the pulmonary or cardiovascular systems, diabetes mellitus, renal
dysfunction, hemoglobinopathies, or immunosuppression (611,626–628 ). Pa-
tients who have musculoskeletal disorders that impede adequate respiration also
may be at high risk for complications resulting from influenza. When high vacci-
nation rates are achieved in closed or semi-closed settings, the risk for outbreaks
is reduced because of induction of herd immunity (629,630 ).
When an institutional outbreak is caused by influenza type A, antiviral agents can
be used both for treatment of ill persons and as prophylaxis for others (631 ). Two
related antiviral agents, amantadine hydrochloride and rimantadine hydrochlo-
ride, are effective against influenza type A but not against influenza type B
(543,632–634 ). These agents can be used in the following ways to prevent illness
caused by influenza A virus: a) as short-term prophylaxis for high-risk persons
after late vaccination; b) as prophylaxis for persons for whom vaccination is con-
traindicated; c) as prophylaxis for immunocompromised persons who might not
produce protective levels of antibody in response to vaccination; d) as prophy-
laxis for unvaccinated HCWs who provide care to patients at high risk for
infection, either for the duration of influenza activity in the community or until
immunity develops after vaccination; and e) as prophylaxis when vaccine strains
do not closely match the epidemic virus strain (631 ).
Vol. 46 / No. RR-1 MMWR 41
Amantadine has been available in the United States for many years; rimantadine
has been approved for use since 1993. Both drugs protect against all naturally
occurring strains of influenza A virus; thus, antigenic changes in the virus that
might reduce vaccine efficacy do not alter the effectiveness of amantadine or
rimantadine. Both drugs are 70%–90% effective in preventing illness if adminis-
tered before exposure to influenza A virus (632,635 ). In addition, they can reduce
the severity and duration of illness caused by influenza A virus if administered
within 24–48 hours after onset of symptoms (636,637 ). These drugs can limit
nosocomial spread of influenza type A if they are administered to all or most pa-
tients when influenza type A illnesses begin in a facility (609,638,639 ).
Compared with rimantadine, amantadine has been associated with a higher inci-
dence of adverse central nervous system (CNS) reactions (e.g., mild and
transitory nervousness, insomnia, impaired concentration, mood changes, and
lightheadedness). These symptoms have been reported in 5%–10% of healthy
young adults receiving 200 mg of amantadine per day (543,632 ). In the elderly,
CNS side effects may be more severe; in addition, dizziness and ataxia occur more
frequently among persons in this age group than among younger persons
(640,641 ). Dose reductions of both amantadine and rimantadine are recom-
mended for certain patients, such as persons ≥65 years of age and/or those who
have renal insufficiency. The drug package inserts for amantadine and riman-
tadine contain important information regarding administration of these drugs.
Guidelines for the use of amantadine and rimantadine and considerations for the
selection of these drugs were published previously by the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP) (631 ).
The emergence of amantadine- and rimantadine-resistant strains of influenza A
virus has been observed in persons who have received these drugs for treatment
of the infection (642,643 ). Because of the potential risk for transmitting resistant
viral strains to contacts of persons receiving amantadine or rimantadine for treat-
ment (643,644 ), infected persons taking either drug should avoid, as much as
possible, contact with others during treatment and for 2 days after discontinuing
treatment (644,645 ). This is particularly important if the contacts are uninfected
high-risk persons (644,646 ).
The primary focus of efforts to prevent and control nosocomial influenza is the
vaccination of high-risk patients and HCWs before the influenza season begins
(628,647,648 ). The decision to use amantadine or rimantadine as an adjunct to
vaccination in the prevention and control of nosocomial influenza is based par-
tially on results of virologic and epidemiologic surveillance in the hospital and the
community. When outbreaks of influenza type A occur in a hospital, and antiviral
prophylaxis of high-risk persons and/or treatment of cases is undertaken, admini-
stration of amantadine or rimantadine should begin as early in the outbreak as
possible to reduce transmission (609,638,631 ).
Measures other than vaccination and chemoprophylaxis have been recom-
mended for controlling nosocomial influenza outbreaks. Because influenza can be
transmitted during contact with an infected person, the following proce-
dures have been recommended: observing contact-isolation precautions, placing
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patients who have symptoms of influenza in private rooms, cohorting patients
who have influenza-like illness, and wearing a mask when entering a room in
which a person who has suspected or confirmed influenza is housed (224 ). Hand-
washing and the wearing of gloves and gowns by HCWs during the patient’s
symptomatic period also have been recommended; however, the exact role of
these measures in preventing influenza transmission has not been determined
(224,608,649 ). Although influenza can be transmitted via the airborne route, the
efficacy of placing infected persons in rooms that have negative air pressure in
relation to their immediate environment has not been assessed. In addition, this
measure may be impractical during institutional outbreaks that occur during a
community epidemic of influenza because many HCWs and newly admitted pa-
tients could be infected with the virus; thus, the hospital would face the logistical
problem of accommodating all ill persons in rooms that have special ventilation.
Although the effectiveness of the following measures has not been determined,
their implementation could be considered during severe outbreaks: a) curtailment
or elimination of elective admissions, both medical and surgical; b) restriction of
cardiovascular and pulmonary surgery; c) restriction of hospital visitors, espe-
cially those who have acute respiratory illnesses; and d) restriction of HCWs who
have an acute respiratory illness from the workplace (649 ).
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Part II. Recommendations for Preventing
Nosocomial Pneumonia
INTRODUCTION
These recommendations are presented in the following order based on the etiology of
the infection: bacterial pneumonia, including Legionnaires disease; fungal pneumonia
(i.e., aspergillosis); and virus-associated pneumonia (i.e., RSV and influenza infec-
tions). Each topic is subdivided according to the following general approaches for
nosocomial infection control:
1. Staff education and infection surveillance;
2. Interruption of transmission of microorganisms by eradicating infecting micro-
organisms from their epidemiologically important reservoirs and/or preventing
person-to-person transmission; and 
3. Modifying host risk for infection.
As in previous CDC guidelines, each recommendation is categorized on the basis of
existing scientific evidence, theoretical rationale, applicability, and economic impact
(224,225,650–654 ). However, the previous CDC system of categorizing recommenda-
tions has been modified as follows:
CATEGORY IA Strongly recommended for all hospitals and strongly
supported by well-designed experimental or epidemio-
logic studies.
CATEGORY IB Strongly recommended for all hospitals and viewed as
effective by experts in the field and a consensus of
HICPAC. These recommendations are based on strong
rationale and suggestive evidence, even though defini-
tive scientific studies may not have been done.
CATEGORY II Suggested for implementation in many hospitals.
These recommendations may be supported by sugges-
tive clinical or epidemiologic studies, a strong theoreti-
cal rationale, or definitive studies applicable to some
but not all hospitals.
NO RECOMMENDATION;
UNRESOLVED ISSUE
Practices for which insufficient evidence or consensus
regarding efficacy exists.
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BACTERIAL PNEUMONIA
 I. Staff Education and Infection Surveillance
A. Staff education
Educate HCWs regarding nosocomial bacterial pneumonias and infection-
control procedures used to prevent these pneumonias (655–661 ). CATE-
GORY IA
B. Surveillance
1. Conduct surveillance of bacterial pneumonia among ICU patients at high
risk for nosocomial bacterial pneumonia (e.g., patients receiving mechani-
cally assisted ventilation and selected postoperative patients) to determine
trends and identify potential problems (6,34,35,62,63,662–664 ). Include
data regarding the causative microorganisms and their antimicrobial sus-
ceptibility patterns (2,3 ). Express data as rates (e.g., number of infected
patients or infections per 100 ICU days or per 1,000 ventilator-days) to
facilitate intrahospital comparisons and determination of trends (66,665–
667 ). CATEGORY IA
2. Do not routinely perform surveillance cultures of patients or of equipment
or devices used for respiratory therapy, pulmonary-function testing, or
delivery of inhalation anesthesia (65,668,669 ). CATEGORY IA
 II. Interrupting Transmission of Microorganisms
A. Sterilization or disinfection and maintenance of equipment and devices
1. General measures
a. Thoroughly clean all equipment and devices before sterilization or disin-
fection (266,267,670 ). CATEGORY IA
b. Sterilize or use high-level disinfection for semicritical equipment or de-
vices (i.e., items that come into direct or indirect contact with mucous
membranes of the lower respiratory tract) (Appendix A). High-level disin-
fection can be achieved either by wet heat pasteurization at 76 C for
30 minutes or by using liquid chemical disinfectants approved as ster-
ilants/ disinfectants by the Environmental Protection Agency and cleared
for marketing for use on medical instruments by the Office of Device
Evaluation, Center for Devices and Radiologic Health, Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (260,262,264,267,671 ). Follow disinfection with appropriate
rinsing, drying, and packaging, taking care not to contaminate the items
in the process. CATEGORY IB
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c. (1) Use sterile (not distilled, nonsterile) water for rinsing reusable semi-
critical equipment and devices used on the respiratory tract after
they have been disinfected chemically (241,249,250,258,269 ). CATE-
GORY IB
(2) No Recommendation for using tap water (as an alternative to sterile
water) to rinse reusable semicritical equipment and devices used on
the respiratory tract after such items have been subjected to high-
level disinfection, regardless of whether rinsing is followed by drying
with or without the use of alcohol (241,249,250,258,269,273,277 ).
UNRESOLVED ISSUE
d. Do not reprocess equipment or devices that are manufactured for a sin-
gle use only, unless data indicate that reprocessing such items poses no
threat to the patient, is cost-effective, and does not change the structural
integrity or function of the equipment or device (672,673 ). CATEGORY IB
2. Mechanical ventilators, breathing circuits, humidifiers, and nebulizers
a. Mechanical ventilators
Do not routinely sterilize or disinfect the internal machinery of mechani-
cal ventilators (126,128,674 ). CATEGORY IA
b. Ventilator circuits with humidifiers
(1) Do not routinely change more frequently than every 48 hours the
breathing circuit, including tubing and exhalation valve, and the at-
tached bubbling or wick humidifier of a ventilator that is being used
on an individual patient (34,283,288 ). CATEGORY IA 
(2) No Recommendation for the maximum length of time after which
the breathing circuit and the attached bubbling or wick humidifier
of a ventilator being used on a patient should be changed (289 ).
UNRESOLVED ISSUE
(3) Sterilize reusable breathing circuits and bubbling or wick humidifiers
or subject them to high-level disinfection between their uses on dif-
ferent patients (259,260,262,264,267 ). CATEGORY IB
(4) Periodically drain and discard any condensate that collects in the
tubing of a mechanical ventilator, taking precautions not to allow
condensate to drain toward the patient. Wash hands after perform-
ing the procedure or handling the fluid (215,282,286 ). CATEGORY IB
(5) No Recommendation for placing a filter or trap at the distal end of
the expiratory-phase tubing of the breathing circuit to collect con-
densate (247,282 ). UNRESOLVED ISSUE
(6) Do not place bacterial filters between the humidifier reservoir and
the inspiratory-phase tubing of the breathing circuit of a mechanical
ventilator. CATEGORY IB
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(7) Humidifier fluids 
(a) Use sterile water to fill bubbling humidifiers (132,241,249, 250,
286 ). CATEGORY II
(b) Use sterile, distilled, or tap water to fill wick humidifiers (249,
250,286 ). CATEGORY II
(c) No Recommendation for preferential use of a closed, continuous-
feed humidification system. UNRESOLVED ISSUE
c. Ventilator breathing circuits with hygroscopic condenser-humidifiers or
heat-moisture exchangers
(1) No Recommendation for preferential use of hygroscopic condenser-
humidifier or heat-moisture exchanger rather than a heated hu-
midifier to prevent nosocomial pneumonia (298–302 ). UNRE-
SOLVED ISSUE 
(2) Change the hygroscopic condenser-humidifier or heat-moisture ex-
changer according to the manufacturer’s recommendation and/or
when evidence of gross contamination or mechanical dysfunction of
the device is present (298 ). CATEGORY IB
(3) Do not routinely change the breathing circuit attached to a hygro-
scopic condenser-humidifier or heat-moisture exchanger while it is
being used on a patient (298,301 ). CATEGORY IB
3. Wall humidifiers
a. Follow manufacturers’ instructions for using and maintaining wall oxy-
gen humidifiers unless data indicate that modifying the instructions
poses no threat to the patient and is cost-effective (675–679 ). CATE-
GORY IB
b. Between uses on different patients, change the tubing, including any na-
sal prongs or mask, used to deliver oxygen from a wall outlet.
CATEGORY IB
4. Small-volume medication nebulizers: “in-line” and hand-held nebulizers
a. (1) Between treatments on the same patient, disinfect, rinse with ster-
ile water, or air-dry small-volume medication nebulizers (242,258 ).
CATEGORY IB
(2) No Recommendation for using tap water as an alternative to sterile
water when rinsing reusable small-volume medication nebulizers
between treatments on the same patient (242,258,273 ). UNRE-
SOLVED ISSUE
48 MMWR January 3, 1997
b. Between uses on different patients, replace nebulizers with those that
have undergone sterilization or high-level disinfection (126,128,129,
269,680 ). CATEGORY IB
c. Use only sterile fluids for nebulization, and dispense these fluids asepti-
cally (238,241,249,250,258,269,304 ). CATEGORY IA
d. If multi-dose medication vials are used, handle, dispense, and store them
according to manufacturers’ instructions (238,304,680–682 ). CATE-
GORY IB
5. Large-volume nebulizers and mist tents
a. Do not use large-volume room-air humidifiers that create aerosols (e.g.,
by Venturi principle, ultrasound, or spinning disk) and thus are actually
nebulizers, unless they can be sterilized or subjected to high-level disin-
fection at least daily and filled only with sterile water (239–241,252,
303,683 ). CATEGORY IA
b. Sterilize large-volume nebulizers that are used for inhalation therapy
(e.g., for tracheostomized patients) or subject them to high-level disinfec-
tion between uses on different patients and after every 24 hours of use
on the same patient (126,128,129 ). CATEGORY IB
c. (1) Use mist-tent nebulizers and reservoirs that have undergone sterili-
zation or high-level disinfection, and replace these items between
uses on different patients (684 ). CATEGORY IB
(2) No Recommendation regarding the frequency of changing mist-tent
nebulizers and reservoirs while such devices are being used on one
patient. UNRESOLVED ISSUE
6. Other devices used in association with respiratory therapy
a. Between uses on different patients, sterilize or subject to high-level disin-
fection portable respirometers, oxygen sensors, and other respiratory
devices used on multiple patients (233,245 ). CATEGORY IB
b. (1) Between uses on different patients, sterilize or subject to high-level
disinfection reusable hand-powered resuscitation bags (e.g., Ambu
bags) (255,311–313 ). CATEGORY IA 
(2) No Recommendation regarding the frequency of changing hydro-
phobic filters placed on the connection port of resuscitation bags.
UNRESOLVED ISSUE
7. Anesthesia machines and breathing systems or patient circuits
a. Do not routinely sterilize or disinfect the internal machinery of anesthesia
equipment (316 ). CATEGORY IA
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b. Clean and then sterilize or subject to high-level liquid chemical disinfec-
tion or pasteurization reusable components of the breathing system or
patient circuit (e.g., tracheal tube or face mask, inspiratory and expiratory
breathing tubing, y-piece, reservoir bag, humidifier, and humidifier tub-
ing) between uses on different patients by following the device manu-
facturers’ instructions for reprocessing such components (260,264,267,
317,685 ). CATEGORY IB
c. No Recommendation for the frequency of routinely cleaning and disin-
fecting unidirectional valves and carbon dioxide absorber chambers
(317–319 ). UNRESOLVED ISSUE
d. Follow published guidelines and/or manufacturers’ instructions regard-
ing in-use maintenance, cleaning, and disinfection or sterilization of other
components or attachments of the breathing system or patient circuit of
anesthesia equipment (317,318 ). CATEGORY IB 
e. Periodically drain and discard any condensate that collects in the tubing
of a breathing circuit, taking precautions not to allow condensate to drain
toward the patient. After performing the procedure or handling the fluid,
wash hands with soap and water or with a waterless handwashing prepa-
ration (218,219,686,687 ). CATEGORY IB
f. No Recommendation for placing a bacterial filter in the breathing system
or patient circuit of anesthesia equipment (1,317,318,321–326,688 ).
UNRESOLVED ISSUE
8.  Pulmonary-function testing equipment
a. Do not routinely sterilize or disinfect the internal machinery of pulmo-
nary-function testing machines between uses on different patients
(327,328 ). CATEGORY II
b. Sterilize or subject to high-level liquid-chemical disinfection or pasteuri-
zation reusable mouthpieces and tubing or connectors between uses on
different patients, OR follow the device manufacturers’ instructions for
their reprocessing (260,261,263–267 ). CATEGORY IB
B. Interrupting person-to-person transmission of bacteria
1. Handwashing
Regardless of whether gloves are worn, wash hands after contact with mu-
cous membranes, respiratory secretions, or objects contaminated with
respiratory secretions. Regardless of whether gloves are worn, wash hands
both before and after contact with a) a patient who has an endotracheal or
tracheostomy tube in place and b) any respiratory device that is used on the
patient (210,212,218,219,231,689,690 ). CATEGORY IA
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2. Barrier precautions
a. Wear gloves for handling respiratory secretions or objects contaminated
with respiratory secretions of any patient (226,227 ). CATEGORY IA
b. Change gloves and wash hands a) after contact with a patient; b) after
handling respiratory secretions or objects contaminated with secretions
from one patient and before contact with another patient, object, or envi-
ronmental surface; and c) between contacts with a contaminated body
site and the respiratory tract of, or respiratory device on, the same patient
(226,228–230 ). CATEGORY IA
c. Wear a gown if soiling with respiratory secretions from a patient is antici-
pated, and change the gown after such contact and before providing care
to another patient (226 ). CATEGORY IB
3. Care of patients who have a tracheostomy
a. Perform tracheostomy under sterile conditions. CATEGORY IB
b. When changing a tracheostomy tube, use aseptic techniques and replace
the tube with one that has undergone sterilization or high-level disinfec-
tion. CATEGORY IB
4. Suctioning of respiratory tract secretions
a. No Recommendation  for wearing sterile gloves rather than clean but
nonsterile gloves when suctioning a patient’s respiratory secretions.
UNRESOLVED ISSUE  
b. If the open-suction system is employed, use a sterile single-use catheter.
CATEGORY II
c. Use only sterile fluid to remove secretions from the suction catheter if the
catheter is to be used for re-entry into the patient’s lower respiratory tract
(691 ). CATEGORY IB
d. No Recommendation for preferential use of the multiuse closed-system
suction catheter or the single-use open-system catheter for prevention of
pneumonia (305–308,310 ). UNRESOLVED ISSUE
e. Change the entire length of suction-collection tubing between uses on
different patients. CATEGORY IB
f. Change suction-collection canisters between uses on different patients
except when used in short-term–care units. CATEGORY IB
Vol. 46 / No. RR-1 MMWR 51
III. Modifying Host Risk for Infection
A. Precautions for preventing endogenous pneumonia
Discontinue enteral-tube feeding and remove devices such as endotracheal,
tracheostomy, and/or enteral (i.e., orogastric, nasogastric, or jejunal) tubes
from patients as soon as the clinical indications for these are resolved
(6,34,35,85–87,117,183,185,186,202,692 ). CATEGORY IB
1. Preventing aspiration associated with enteral feeding
a. If the maneuver is not contraindicated, elevate at an angle of 30º–45º the
head of the bed of a patient at high risk for aspiration pneumonia (e.g., a
patient receiving mechanically assisted ventilation and/or who has an en-
teral tube in place) (74,185 ). CATEGORY IB
b. Routinely verify the appropriate placement of the feeding tube (693–
695 ) . CATEGORY IB
c. Routinely assess the patient’s intestinal motility (e.g., by auscultating for
bowel sounds and measuring residual gastric volume or abdominal
girth) and adjust the rate and volume of enteral feeding to avoid regurgi-
tation (692 ). CATEGORY IB 
d. No Recommendation for the preferential use of small-bore tubes for en-
teral feeding (694 ). UNRESOLVED ISSUE
e. No Recommendation for administering enteral feeding continuously or
intermittently (70,193,198 ). UNRESOLVED ISSUE
f. No Recommendation for preferentially placing the feeding tubes (e.g.,
jejunal tubes) distal to the pylorus (199,200 ). UNRESOLVED ISSUE
2. Preventing aspiration associated with endotracheal intubation
a. No Recommendation for using orotracheal rather than nasotracheal tube
to prevent nosocomial pneumonia (696 ). UNRESOLVED ISSUE
b. No Recommendation for routinely using an endotracheal tube with a dor-
sal lumen above the endotracheal cuff to allow drainage (i.e., by
suctioning) of tracheal secretions that accumulate in the patient’s sub-
glottic area (206 ). UNRESOLVED ISSUE
c. Before deflating the cuff of an endotracheal tube in preparation for tube
removal, or before moving the tube, ensure that secretions are cleared
from above the tube cuff. CATEGORY IB
3. Preventing gastric colonization
a. If stress-bleeding prophylaxis is needed for a patient receiving mechani-
cally assisted ventilation, use an agent that does not raise the patient’s
gastric pH (22,34,112,118,122,147–154 ). CATEGORY II 
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b. No Recommendation for selective decontamination of a critically ill, me-
chanically ventilated, or ICU patient’s digestive tract with oral and/or
intravenous antimicrobials to prevent gram-negative bacillary (or Can-
dida sp.) pneumonia (155–180 ). UNRESOLVED ISSUE
c. No Recommendation for routine acidification of gastric feedings to pre-
vent nosocomial pneumonia (181 ). UNRESOLVED ISSUE
B. Preventing postoperative pneumonia
1. Instruct preoperative patients, especially those at high risk for contracting
pneumonia, regarding frequent coughing, taking deep breaths, and ambu-
lating as soon as medically indicated during the postoperative period
(346,348 ). Patients at high risk include those who will receive anesthesia—
especially those who will have an abdominal, thoracic, head, or neck
operation—and those who have substantial pulmonary dysfunction (e.g.,
patients who have chronic obstructive lung disease, a musculoskeletal
abnormality of the chest, or abnormal pulmonary function tests) (331–
334,337,338 ). CATEGORY IB
2. Encourage postoperative patients to cough frequently, take deep breaths,
move about the bed, and ambulate unless these actions are medically
contraindicated (345,346,348 ). CATEGORY IB
3. Control pain that interferes with coughing and deep breathing during the
immediate postoperative period by a) using systemic analgesia (352,697 ),
including patient-controlled analgesia (353–355 ), with as little cough-
suppressant effect as possible; b) providing appropriate support for ab-
dominal wounds, such as tightly placing a pillow across the abdomen; or
c) administering regional analgesia (e.g., epidural analgesia) (356–358 ).
CATEGORY IB
4. Use an incentive spirometer or intermittent positive-pressure breathing
equipment on patients at high risk for contracting postoperative pneumonia
(339,342,343,346,348,349 ). (See Section III-B-1 above for definition of high-
risk patients.) CATEGORY II
C. Other prophylactic procedures for pneumonia
1. Vaccination of patients
Vaccinate patients at high risk for complications of pneumococcal infections
with pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine. Such patients include persons
ages ≥65 years; adults who have chronic cardiovascular or pulmonary dis-
ease, diabetes mellitus, alcoholism, cirrhosis, or cerebrospinal fluid leaks;
and children and adults who are immunosuppressed or who have func-
tional or anatomic asplenia or HIV infection (362–364 ). CATEGORY IA
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2. Antimicrobial prophylaxis
Do not routinely administer systemic antimicrobial agents to prevent noso-
comial pneumonia (74,91,201,366–370,698 ). CATEGORY IA 
3. Use of rotating “kinetic” beds or continuous lateral rotational therapy
No Recommendation for the routine use of kinetic beds or continuous
lateral rotational therapy (i.e., placing the patient on a bed that turns inter-
mittently or continuously on its longitudinal axis) for prevention of
nosocomial pneumonia in patients in the ICU, critically ill patients, or pa-
tients immobilized by illness and/or trauma (372–377,699 ). UNRESOLVED
ISSUE
PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF LEGIONNAIRES DISEASE
 I. Staff Education and Infection Surveillance
A. Staff education
Educate a) physicians to heighten their suspicion for cases of nosocomial
Legionnaires disease and to use appropriate methods for its diagnosis and
b) other hospital personnel (i.e., patient-care, infection-control, and engineer-
ing personnel) about measures to control nosocomial legionellosis (659–661 ).
CATEGORY IA
B. Surveillance
1. Establish mechanism(s) to provide clinicians with appropriate labora-
tory tests for the diagnosis of Legionnaires disease (386,413-415,700 ).
CATEGORY IA
2. Maintain a high index of suspicion for the diagnosis of nosocomial Legion-
naires disease, especially in patients who are at high risk for acquiring the
disease. Such patients include those who are immunosuppressed (e.g.,
organ-transplant recipients, patients who have AIDS, and patients being
treated with systemic steroids), those who are ≥65 years of age, and those
who have a chronic underlying disease (e.g., diabetes mellitus, congestive
heart failure, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease) (385,386,399,401–
405,411 ). CATEGORY II
3. No Recommendation for routinely culturing water systems for Legionella
sp. (271,385,428,432,434,435,437–439,454,701 ). UNRESOLVED ISSUE
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 II. Interrupting Transmission of Legionella sp.
A. Primary prevention (preventing nosocomial Legionnaires disease when no
cases have been documented)
1. Nebulization and other devices
a. (1) Use sterile (not distilled, nonsterile) water for rinsing nebulization
devices and other semicritical respiratory-care equipment after
such items have been cleaned and/or disinfected (258,271,702 ).
CATEGORY IB
(2) No Recommendation for using tap water as an alternative to sterile
water for rinsing reusable semicritical equipment and devices used
on the respiratory tract after they have been subjected to high-level
disinfection, regardless of whether rinsing is followed by drying with
or without the use of alcohol. UNRESOLVED ISSUE
b. Use only sterile (not distilled, nonsterile) water to fill reservoirs of devices
used for nebulization (241,252,258,271,702 ). CATEGORY IA
c. Do not use large-volume room-air humidifiers that create aerosols (e.g.,
by Venturi principle, ultrasound, or spinning disk), and thus are actually
nebulizers, unless they can be sterilized or subjected to high-level disin-
fection daily and filled only with sterile water (252,702 ). CATEGORY IA
2. Cooling towers
a. When a new hospital building is constructed, place cooling tower(s) in
such a way that the tower drift is directed away from the hospital’s air-
intake system and design the cooling towers such that the volume of
aerosol drift is minimized (421,703 ). CATEGORY IB 
b. For operational cooling towers, install drift eliminators, regularly use an
effective biocide, maintain the tower according to the manufacturer’s rec-
ommendations, and keep adequate maintenance records (Appendix D)
(421,463,704 ). CATEGORY IB
3. Water-distribution system
a. No Recommendation for routinely maintaining potable water at the out-
let at ≥50 C or <20 C, or chlorinating heated water to achieve 1–2 mg/L
free residual chlorine at the tap (385,428,439,446–449 ). UNRESOLVED
ISSUE
b. No Recommendation for treating water with ozone, ultraviolet light, or
heavy-metal ions (457,459–462,465 ). UNRESOLVED ISSUE
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B. Secondary prevention (response to identification of laboratory-confirmed
nosocomial legionellosis)
When a single case of laboratory-confirmed, definite nosocomial Legionnaires
disease is identified, OR if two or more cases of laboratory-confirmed, possible
nosocomial Legionnaires disease occur during a 6-month period, the following
procedures are recommended:
1. Contact the local or state health department or CDC if the disease is
reportable in the state or if assistance is needed. CATEGORY IB
2. If a case is identified in a severely immunocompromised patient (e.g., an
organ-transplant recipient) OR if severely immunocompromised patients
are being treated in the hospital, conduct a combined epidemiologic and
environmental investigation (as described in II-B-3-b-1 through II-B-5) to
determine the source(s) of Legionella sp. CATEGORY IB
3. If severely immunocompromised patients are not being treated in the
hopsital, conduct an epidemiologic investigation via a retrospective review
of microbiologic, serologic, and postmortem data to identify previous cases,
and begin an intensive prospective surveillance for additional cases of
nosocomial Legionnaires disease. CATEGORY IB
a. If evidence of continued nosocomial transmission is not present, con-
tinue the intensive prospective surveillance (as described in II-B-3) for at
least 2 months after the date surveillance was initiated. CATEGORY II
b. If evidence of continued nosocomial transmission is present:
(1) Conduct an environmental investigation to determine the source(s)
of Legionella sp. by collecting water samples from potential sources
of aerosolized water, following the methods described in Appen-
dix C, and saving and subtyping isolates of Legionella sp. obtained
from patients and the environment (241,258,421–427,450,452 ).
CATEGORY IB
(2) If a source is not identified, continue surveillance for new cases for at
least 2 months, and, depending on the scope of the outbreak, de-
cide either to defer decontamination pending identification of the
source(s) of Legionella sp. or proceed with decontamination of the
hospital’s water distribution system, with special attention to the
specific hospital areas involved in the outbreak. CATEGORY II
(3) If a source of infection is identified by epidemiologic and environ-
mental investigation, promptly decontaminate it (465 ). CATE-
GORY IB
(a) If the heated-water system is implicated:
 i. Decontaminate the heated-water system either by superheating
(i.e., flushing for at least 5 minutes each distal outlet of the
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system with water at ≥65 C) OR by hyperchlorination (i.e., flush-
ing for at least 5 minutes all outlets of the system with water
containing ≥10 mg/L of free residual chlorine) (449,450,454,455 ).
Post warning signs at each outlet being flushed to prevent scald
injury to patients, staff, or visitors. CATEGORY IB
 ii. Depending on local and state regulations regarding potable
water temperature in public buildings (456 ), in hospitals hous-
ing patients who are at high risk for acquiring nosocom-
ial legionellosis (e.g., immunocompromised patients) either
a) maintain potable water at the outlet at ≥50 C or <20 C or
b) chlorinate heated water to achieve 1–2 mg/L of free residual
chlorine at the tap (385,428,439,446–449 ) (Appendix B). CATE-
GORY II
iii. No Recommendation for treatment of water with ozone, ultra-
violet light, or heavy-metal ions (457,459,460,462 ).
UNRESOLVED ISSUE
iv. Clean hot-water storage tanks and water heaters to remove ac-
cumulated scale and sediment (392 ). CATEGORY IB
 v. Restrict immunocompromised patients from taking showers,
and use only sterile water for their oral consumption until
Legionella sp. becomes undetectable by culture in the hospital
water (429 ). CATEGORY II
(b) If cooling towers or evaporative condensers are implicated, de-
contaminate the cooling-tower system (Appendix D) (463 ).
CATEGORY IB
(4) Assess the efficacy of implemented measures in reducing or elimi-
nating Legionella sp. by collecting specimens for culture at 2-week
intervals for 3 months. CATEGORY II
(a) If Legionella sp. are not detected in cultures during 3 months of
monitoring at 2-week intervals, collect cultures monthly for an-
other 3 months. CATEGORY II
(b) If Legionella sp. are detected in one or more cultures, reassess the
implemented control measures, modify them accordingly, and
repeat the decontamination procedures. Options for repeat de-
contamination include either the intensive use of the same
technique used for initial decontamination or a combination of su-
perheating and hyperchlorination. CATEGORY II
(5) Keep adequate records of all infection-control measures, including
maintenance procedures, and of environmental test results for cool-
ing towers and potable-water systems. CATEGORY II
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PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF
NOSOCOMIAL PULMONARY ASPERGILLOSIS
 I. Staff Education and Infection Surveillance
A. Staff education
Educate HCWs about nosocomial pulmonary aspergillosis, especially with
respect to immunocompromised patients, and about infection-control pro-
cedures used to reduce its occurrence (659–661 ). CATEGORY IA
B. Surveillance
1. Maintain a high index of suspicion for the diagnosis of nosocomial pul-
monary aspergillosis in patients who are at high risk for the disease (i.e.,
patients who have prolonged, severe granulocytopenia [<1,000 polymor-
phonuclear cells/mm3 for 2 weeks or <100 polymorphonuclear cells/mm3
for 1 week], particularly bone-marrow–transplant recipients) (510,511,705 ).
Patients who have received solid-organ transplants and patients who have
hematologic malignancies and are receiving chemotherapy also are at high
risk for acquiring the infection if they are severely granulocytopenic
(472,485,510,706 ). CATEGORY IB
2. Maintain surveillance for cases of nosocomial pulmonary aspergillosis by
periodically reviewing the hospital’s microbiologic, histopathologic, and
postmortem data. CATEGORY IB
3. No Recommendation for performing routine, periodic cultures of a) the
nasopharynx of high-risk patients or b) devices, air samples, dust, ventila-
tion ducts, and filters in rooms occupied by high-risk patients
(466,478,517,494,520–522 ). UNRESOLVED ISSUE
 II. Interrupting Transmission of Aspergillus sp. Spores
A. Planning new specialized-care units for patients at high risk for infection
1. When constructing new specialized-care units for patients at high risk for
infection, ensure that patient rooms have adequate capacity to minimize
fungal spore counts via maintenance of a) HEPA filtration, b) directed room
airflow, c) positive air pressure in patients’ rooms relative to the air pressure
in the corridor, d) properly sealed rooms, and e) high rates of room-air
changes (473,528–530,533,537,707,708 ). CATEGORY IB
a. Air filtration. Install, either centrally or at the point of use (i.e., at the
room-air intake site), HEPA filters that are 99.97% efficient in filtering par-
ticles ≥0.3 µm in diameter (473,528–530,533,537,707,708 ). CATEGORY IB
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b. Directed room airflow. Place air-intake and exhaust ports such that room
air comes in from one side of the room, flows across the patient’s bed,
and exits on the opposite side of the room (529,530 ). CATEGORY IB
c. Well-sealed room. Construct windows, doors, and intake and exhaust
ports to achieve complete sealing of the room against air leaks (529,530 ) .
CATEGORY IB
d. Room-air pressure. Ensure that room-air pressure can be maintained
continuously above that of the corridor (e.g., as can be demonstrated by
performance of the smoke-tube test) unless contraindicated by clinical-
care or infection-control considerations (529,530 ). CATEGORY IB
(1) To maintain positive room-air pressure in relation to the corridor, sup-
ply air to the room at a rate that is 10%–20% greater than the rate of
air being exhausted from the room (529,530 ). CATEGORY IB
(2) For placement of patients who are at high risk for aspergillosis and
who also have an infection (e.g., varicella or infectious tuberculosis)
that necessitates negative room-air pressure in relation to the corri-
dor, provide optimal conditions to prevent the spread of the airborne
infection from and acquisition of aspergillosis by the patient (e.g., by
providing anterooms with an independent exhaust) (529 ). CATE-
GORY II 
e. Room-air changes. Ventilate the room to ensure ≥12 room-air changes
per hour are maintained (1,529,535,536 ). CATEGORY II
2. No Recommendation for the preferential installation of a particular system,
such as one with ultra-high air change rates (i.e., 100–400 air changes per
hour) (e.g., laminar airflow), over other systems that meet the conditions in
Sections II-A-1-a through II-A-1-e (473,528–530,533,537,707,708 ). UNRE-
SOLVED ISSUE
3. Formulate hospital policies to minimize exposures of high-risk patients to
potential sources of Aspergillus sp. (e.g., hospital construction and renova-
tion, cleaning activities, carpets, food, potted plants, and flower
arrangements) (466,517,522,527,709–711 ). CATEGORY IB
4. No Recommendation for prophylactic use of copper-8-quinolinolate biocide
in fireproofing material (466,477,530,537 ). UNRESOLVED ISSUE
B. In existing facilities with no cases of nosocomial aspergillosis
1. Place patients who are at high risk for infection in a protected environment
that meets the conditions described in Sections II-A-1-a through II-A-1-e
(473,517,528,537,707,708,712 ). CATEGORY IB
2. Routinely inspect air-handling systems in hospital areas in which patients
at high risk for infection are housed, maintain adequate air exchanges and
pressure differentials, and eliminate air leakages. Coordinate repairs of the
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system with the relocation of patients who are at high risk for infection to
other hospital areas that have optimal air-handling capabilities (466,478,
517 ) . CATEGORY IB
3. Minimize the length of time that patients who are at high risk for infection
are outside their rooms for diagnostic procedures and other activities; when
such patients leave their rooms, require them to wear well-fitting masks
capable of filtering Aspergillus sp. spores. CATEGORY IB
4. Prevent dust accumulation by damp-dusting horizontal surfaces on a daily
basis, regularly cleaning ceiling tiles and air-duct grates when the rooms
are not occupied by patients, and maintaining adequate seals on windows
to prevent outside air from entering the room, especially in areas occupied
by patients at high risk for aspergillosis (517 ). CATEGORY IB
5. Systematically review and coordinate infection-control strategies with per-
sonnel in charge of hospital engineering, maintenance, central supply and
distribution, and catering (466,522 ). CATEGORY IB
6. When planning hospital construction and renovation activities, assess
whether patients at high risk for aspergillosis are likely to be exposed to
high ambient-air spore counts of Aspergillus sp. from construction and
renovation sites, and, if so, develop a plan to prevent such exposures
(466,522 ). CATEGORY IB
7. During construction or renovation activities:
a. Construct barriers between patient-care and construction areas to pre-
vent dust from entering patient-care areas; these barriers (e.g., plastic or
drywall) should be impermeable to Aspergillus sp. (67,478,521,522 ).
CATEGORY IB
b. In construction/renovation areas inside the hospital, create and maintain
negative air pressure relative to that in adjacent patient-care areas unless
such a pressure differential is contraindicated (e.g., if patients in the adja-
cent patient-care areas have infectious tuberculosis) (466,478,521,522,
537 ). CATEGORY II
c. Direct pedestrian traffic from construction areas away from patient-care
areas to limit the opening and closing of doors or other barriers that
might cause dust dispersion, entry of contaminated air, or tracking of
dust into patient-care areas (466,478,521,522 ). CATEGORY IB
d. Clean newly constructed areas before allowing patients to enter the areas
(466,522 ). CATEGORY IB
8. Eliminate exposures of patients at high risk for aspergillosis to activities that
might cause spores of Aspergillus sp. and other fungi to be aerosolized (e.g.,
floor or carpet vacuuming) (466,517,522 ). CATEGORY IB
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9. Eliminate exposures of patients at high risk for aspergillosis to potential
environmental sources of Aspergillus sp. (e.g., Aspergillus-contaminated
food, potted plants, or flower arrangements) (466,517,522,709–711 ). CATE-
GORY II
10. Prevent birds from gaining access to hospital air-intake ducts (523 ). CATE-
GORY IB
C. The following procedures should be followed if a case of nosocomial
aspergillosis occurs:
1. Begin a prospective search for additional cases in hospitalized patients and
an intensified retrospective review of the hospital’s microbiologic, his-
topathologic, and postmortem records. CATEGORY IB
2. If evidence of continuing transmission is not present, continue routine
maintenance procedures to prevent nosocomial aspergillosis (see Sections
II-B-1 through II-B-10). CATEGORY IB
3. If evidence of continuing Aspergillus sp. infection is present, conduct an
environmental investigation to determine and eliminate the source. If assis-
tance is needed, contact the local or state health department (473,477,478,
521,533,537 ). CATEGORY IB
a. Collect environmental samples from potential sources of Aspergillus sp.,
especially those sources implicated in the epidemiologic investigation,
by using appropriate methods (e.g., use of a high-volume air sampler
rather than settle plates) (473,477,478,521,533,537,713 ). CATEGORY IB
b. Depending on test availability, perform molecular subtyping of Aspergil-
lus sp. obtained from patients and the environment to establish strain
identity (525,526 ). CATEGORY IB
c. If air-handling systems that supply air to areas in which high-risk patients
are housed are not optimal, consider temporary deployment of portable
HEPA filters until rooms with optimal air-handling systems are available
for all patients at high risk for invasive aspergillosis. CATEGORY II
d. If an environmental source of exposure to Aspergillus sp. is identified,
perform corrective measures as needed to eliminate the source from the
environment of patients at high risk for infection. CATEGORY IB
e. If an environmental source of exposure to Aspergillus sp. is not identi-
fied, review existing infection-control measures, including engineering
aspects, to identify potential areas that can be corrected or improved.
CATEGORY IB
Vol. 46 / No. RR-1 MMWR 61
III. Modifying Host Risk for Infection
A. Administer cytokines, including granulocyte-colony–stimulating factor and
granulocyte-macrophage–stimulating factor, to increase host resistance to
aspergillosis by decreasing the duration and severity of chemotherapy-
induced granulocytopenia (512,513 ). CATEGORY II
B. No Recommendation for administration of intranasal amphotericin B or oral
antifungal agents (including amphotericin B and triazole compounds) to
high-risk patients for prophylaxis against aspergillosis (514,515,714 ).
UNRESOLVED ISSUE
PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF RSV INFECTION
 I. Staff Education and Infection Surveillance
A. Staff education
Educate personnel regarding the epidemiology, modes of transmission, and
means of preventing transmission of RSV (226,659–661 ). CATEGORY IA
B. Surveillance
1. Establish mechanism(s) by which the appropriate hospital personnel are
promptly alerted to any increase in RSV activity in the local community.
CATEGORY IB
2. During December–March and periods of increased prevalence of RSV in the
community, attempt prompt diagnosis of RSV infection by using rapid
diagnostic techniques as clinically indicated for pediatric patients, espe-
cially infants, and for immunocompromised adults who have a respiratory
illness at the time of hospital admission (592,596 ). CATEGORY IB
 II. Interrupting Transmission of RSV
A. Preventing person-to-person transmission
1. Primary measures for contact isolation
a. Handwashing. Regardless of whether gloves have been worn, wash
hands after contact with a patient or after touching respiratory secretions
or fomites potentially contaminated with respiratory secretions (218,231,
553,583–585,594 ). CATEGORY IA
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b. Wearing gloves.
(1) Wear gloves while handling patients or respiratory secretions of pa-
tients who have confirmed or suspected RSV infection and while
handling fomites potentially contaminated with patient secretions
(226,553,583,584,590,596 ). CATEGORY IA
(2) Change gloves a) between contact with different patients and b) after
handling respiratory secretions or fomites contaminated with secre-
tions from one patient before contact with another patient (226,228 ).
Wash hands after removing gloves. (See II-A-1-a.) CATEGORY IA
c. Wearing a gown. Wear a gown if clothing could be soiled by the respira-
tory secretions of a patient (e.g., when handling infants who have RSV
infection or other viral respiratory illness), and change the gown after
such contact and before caring for another patient (226,589,591,596 ).
CATEGORY IB 
d. Staffing. Restrict HCWs who are in the acute stages of an upper respira-
tory illness (i.e., those who are sneezing and/or coughing) from providing
care to infants and other patients at high risk for complications from RSV
infection (e.g., children who have severe underlying cardiopulmonary
conditions, children receiving chemotherapy for malignancy, premature
infants, and patients who are otherwise immunocompromised) (594,
596 ). CATEGORY IB
e. Limiting visitors. Do not allow persons who have symptoms of respira-
tory infection to visit uninfected pediatric, immunosuppressed, or cardiac
patients (590 ). CATEGORY II
2. Controlling RSV outbreaks
a. Use of private rooms, cohorting, and patient-screening. To control ongo-
ing RSV transmission in the hospital, admit young children who have
symptoms of viral respiratory illness to single rooms if possible, OR per-
form RSV-screening diagnostic tests on young children at the time of
hospital admission and cohort them according to their RSV-infection
status (590,592,594,596 ). CATEGORY II
b. Personnel cohorting. During an outbreak of nosocomial RSV, cohort per-
sonnel as much as practical (i.e., restrict personnel who provide care to
infected patients from providing care to uninfected patients, and vice-
versa) (590,594,596 ). CATEGORY II
c. Postponing patient admission. During outbreaks of nosocomial RSV,
postpone elective admission of uninfected patients at high risk for com-
plications from RSV infection. CATEGORY II
d. Wearing eye-nose goggles. No Recommendation for wearing eye-nose
goggles during close contact with an RSV-infected patient (593,597 ).
UNRESOLVED ISSUE
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PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF INFLUENZA
 I. Staff Education and Infection Surveillance
A. Staff education
Educate HCWs about the epidemiology, modes of transmission, and means of
preventing transmission of influenza (659–661,715,716 ). CATEGORY IA
B. Surveillance
1. Establish mechanism(s) by which the appropriate hospital personnel are
promptly alerted of any increase in influenza activity in the local community.
CATEGORY IB
2. Arrange for laboratory tests to be available to clinicians, for use when
clinically indicated, to promptly confirm the diagnosis of influenza and other
acute viral respiratory illnesses, especially during November–April (620–
625 ) . CATEGORY IB
 II. Modifying Host Risk for Infection
A. Vaccination
1. Patients. Offer vaccine to outpatients and inpatients at high risk for compli-
cations from influenza, beginning in September and continuing until
influenza activity has begun to decline (628,647,648,717–719 ). Patients at
high risk for complications from influenza include persons ≥65 years of age;
persons who are in long-term–care units; or persons who have chronic
disorders of the pulmonary or cardiovascular systems, diabetes mellitus,
renal dysfunction, hemoglobinopathies, or immunosuppression; persons
6 months–18 years of age who are receiving long-term aspirin therapy
(628 ); and persons who have musculoskeletal disorders that impede ade-
quate respiration. CATEGORY IA
2. Personnel. Vaccinate HCWs before the influenza season begins each year,
preferably between mid-October and mid-November. Until influenza activ-
ity declines, continue to make vaccine available to newly hired personnel
and to those who initially refused vaccination. If vaccine supply is limited,
give highest priority to vaccination of HCWs caring for patients at greatest
risk for severe complications from influenza infection (see Section II-A-1)
(628 ). CATEGORY IB
B. Use of antiviral agents. (See Section IV, Controlling Influenza Outbreaks.)
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III. Interrupting Person-to-Person Transmission
A. Keep a patient who has suspected or confirmed influenza in a private room or,
unless medically contraindicated, in a room with other patients who have
confirmed influenza. CATEGORY IB
B. As much as feasible, maintain negative air pressure in rooms of patients for
whom influenza is suspected or diagnosed, or place persons who have
influenza-like illness together in a hospital area that has an independent
air-supply and exhaust system (613,614,616,720 ). CATEGORY II
C. Institute the wearing of masks among persons—except those immune to the
infecting virus strain—who enter the room of a patient who has influenza
(613,614,720 ). CATEGORY IB
D. As much as possible during periods of influenza activity in the community, the
hospital’s employee health service should evaluate HCWs who have fever and
symptoms of upper respiratory tract infection suggestive of influenza for
possible removal from duties that involve direct patient contact. Use more
stringent guidelines for HCWs working in certain patient-care areas (e.g., ICUs,
nurseries, and units with severely immunosuppressed patients) (649,721 ).
CATEGORY II
E. When community and/or nosocomial outbreaks occur, especially if they are
characterized by high attack rates and severe illness, initiate the following:
1. Restrict hospital visitors who have a febrile respiratory illness. CATE-
GORY IB
2. Curtail or eliminate elective medical and surgical admissions as necessary.
CATEGORY IB
3. Restrict cardiovascular and pulmonary surgery to emergency cases only.
CATEGORY IB
IV. Controlling Influenza Outbreaks
A. Determining the outbreak strain
Early in the outbreak, obtain nasopharyngeal-swab or nasal-wash specimens
from patients who recently had onset of symptoms suggestive of influenza for
influenza virus culture or antigen detection. CATEGORY IB
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B. Vaccinating patients and HCWs
Administer current influenza vaccine to unvaccinated patients and HCWs, es-
pecially if the outbreak occurs early in the influenza season (609,628 ).
CATEGORY IB
C. Administering amantadine or rimantadine
1. When a nosocomial outbreak of influenza A is suspected or identified:
a. Administer amantadine or rimantadine for prophylaxis to all uninfected
patients in the involved unit who do not have contraindications to these
drugs. Do not delay administration of amantadine or rimantadine unless
the results of diagnostic tests to identify the infecting strain(s) can be
obtained within 12–24 hours after specimen collection (631,634 ). CATE-
GORY IB
b. Administer amantadine or rimantadine for prophylaxis to unvaccinated
HCWs who do not have medical contraindications to these drugs and
who are in the involved unit or providing care to patients at high risk for
infection (631 ). CATEGORY II
2. Discontinue amantadine or rimantadine if laboratory tests confirm or
strongly suggest that influenza type A is not the cause of the outbreak (632 ) .
CATEGORY IA
3. If the cause of the outbreak is confirmed or believed to be influenza type A
AND vaccine has been administered only recently to susceptible patients
and HCWs, continue amantadine or rimantadine prophylaxis until 2 weeks
after the vaccination (722 ). CATEGORY IB
4. To the extent possible, do not allow contact between those at high risk for
complications from influenza and patients or HCWs who are taking aman-
tadine or rimantadine for treatment of acute respiratory illness; prevent
contact during and for 2 days after the latter discontinue treatment
(633,642–646 ). CATEGORY IB
D. Interrupting person-to-person transmission of microorganisms. (See Section
III, A–E.)
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APPENDIX A
Examples of Semicritical Items*
Used on the Respiratory Tract
• Anesthesia device or equipment, including:
— Face mask or tracheal tube,
— Inspiratory and expiratory tubing,
— Y-piece,
— Reservoir bag, and
— Humidifier;
• Breathing circuits of mechanical ventilators;
• Bronchoscopes and their accessories, except for biopsy forceps and specimen
brush, which are considered critical items and are sterilized before reuse;
• Endotracheal and endobronchial tubes;
• Laryngoscope blades;
• Mouthpieces and tubing of pulmonary-function testing equipment;
• Nebulizers and their reservoirs;
• Oral and nasal airways;





*Items that directly or indirectly contact mucous membranes of the respiratory tract; these
should be sterilized or subjected to high-level disinfection before reuse.
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APPENDIX B
Maintenance Procedures Used to Decrease Survival
and Multiplication of Legionella sp.
in Potable-Water Distribution Systems
 I. Providing water at ≥50 C at all points in the heated water system, including the
taps.
This requires that water in calorifiers (water heaters) be maintained at ≥60 C. In
the United Kingdom, where maintenance of water temperatures at ≥50 C in hospi-
tals has been mandated, installation of blending or mixing valves at or near taps
to reduce the water temperature to ≤43 C has been recommended in certain set-
tings to reduce the risk for scald injury to patients, visitors, and HCWs (446 ).
However, Legionella sp. can multiply even in short segments of pipe containing
water at this temperature. Increasing the flow rate from the hot-water-circulation
system may help lessen the likelihood of water stagnation and cooling (449,723 ).
Insulation of plumbing to ensure delivery of cold (<20 C) water to water heaters
(and to cold-water outlets) may diminish the opportunity for bacterial multiplica-
tion (391 ). Both “dead legs” and “capped spurs”* within the plumbing system
provide areas of stagnation and cooling to <50 C regardless of the circulating-
water temperature; these segments may need to be removed to prevent
colonization (724 ). Rubber fittings within plumbing systems have been associ-
ated with persistent colonization, and replacement of these fittings may be
required for Legionella sp. eradication (725 ).
 II. Continuous chlorination to maintain concentrations of free residual chlorine at
1–2 mg/L at the tap
This requires the placement of flow-adjusted, continuous injectors of chlorine
throughout the water distribution system. The adverse effects of continuous
chlorination include accelerated corrosion of plumbing, which results in system
leaks and production of potentially carcinogenic trihalomethanes. However, when
levels of free residual chlorine are below 3 mg/L, trihalomethane levels are kept
below the maximum safety level recommended by the Environmental Protection
Agency (447,726,727 ).
*A dead leg is a pipe, or spur, leading from the water recirculating system to an outlet that is
used infrequently (i.e., the heat or chlorine in the recirculating system cannot adequately flow
to the outlet). A capped spur is a pipe leading from the water recirculating system to an outlet
that has been closed off (i.e., the spur has been “capped”). A capped spur cannot be flushed,
and it might not be noticed unless the surrounding wall is removed.




 I. Recommended procedure for collecting and processing environmental
specimens for Legionella sp. (728 )
A. Collect water (if possible, 1-L samples) in sterile, screw-top bottles, preferably
containing sodium thiosulfate at a concentration of 0.5 cc of 0.1 N solution of
sample water. (Sodium thiosulfate inactivates any residual halogen biocide.)
B. Collect culture-swabs of the internal surfaces of faucets, aerators, and
showerheads; in a sterile, screw-top container, such as a 50-cc plastic
centrifuge tube, submerge each swab in 5–10 cc of sample water taken from
the same device from which the sample was obtained.
C. As soon as possible after collection, water samples and swabs should be
transported to and processed in a laboratory proficient at culturing water
specimens for Legionella sp. Samples may be transported at room tem-
perature but must be protected from temperature extremes.
D. Test samples for the presence of Legionella sp. by using semi-selective culture
media. Use standard laboratory procedures. (Detection of Legionella sp.
antigen by the direct fluorescent antibody technique is not suitable for
environmental samples [729–731 ]. In addition, the use of polymerase chain
reaction for identification of Legionella sp. is not recommended until more data
regarding the sensitivity and specificity of this procedure are available [732 ].)
 II. Possible samples and sampling sites for Legionella sp. in the hospital (733 )
Water samples
• Potable water system
— Incoming water main
— Water softener 
— Holding tanks/cisterns
— Water heater tanks (at the inflow and outflow sites)
• Potable water outlets (e.g., faucets or taps, showers), especially outlets located
in or near case-patients’ rooms
• Cooling tower/evaporative condenser
— Make-up water (i.e., water added to the system to replace water lost by
evaporation, drift, and leakage) 
— Basin (i.e., area under tower for collection of cooled water)
— Sump (i.e., section of basin from which cooled water returns to heat
source)
— Heat source (e.g., chillers)
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Water samples (cont’d.)
• Other sources
• Humidifiers (i.e., nebulizers)
— Bubblers for oxygen
— Water used for respiratory therapy equipment
— Decorative fountains
— Irrigation equipment
— Fire sprinkler system (if recently used)
— Whirlpools/spas
Swabs
• Potable water system




— Internal components (e.g., splash bars and other fill surfaces)
— Areas with visible biofilm accumulation
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APPENDIX D
Procedure for Cleaning Cooling Towers
and Related Equipment*
 I. Before chemical disinfection and mechanical cleaning
A. Provide protective equipment to workers who perform the disinfection, to
prevent their exposure to a) chemicals used for disinfection and b) aerosolized
water containing Legionella sp. Protective equipment may include full-length
protective clothing, boots, gloves, goggles, and a full- or half-face mask that
combines a HEPA filter and chemical cartridges to protect against airborne
chlorine levels of up to 10 mg/L.
B. Shut off cooling-tower.
1. If possible, shut off the heat source.
2. Shut off fans, if present, on the cooling tower/evaporative condenser
(CT/EC).
3. Shut off the system blowdown (i.e., purge) valve. Shut off the automated
blowdown controller, if present, and set the system controller to manual.
4. Keep make-up water valves open.
5. Close building air-intake vents within at least 30 m of the CT/EC until after
the cleaning procedure is complete.
6. Continue operating pumps for water circulation through the CT/EC.
 II. Chemical disinfection
A. Add fast-release, chlorine-containing disinfectant in pellet, granular, or liquid
form, and follow safety instructions on the product label. Examples of
disinfectants include sodium hypochlorite (NaOCl) or calcium hypochlorite
(Ca[OCl]2), calculated to achieve initial free residual chlorine (FRC) of 50 mg/L
(i.e., 3.0 lbs [1.4 kg] industrial grade NaOCl [12%–15% available Cl] per
1,000 gal of CT/EC water; 10.5 lbs [4.8 kg] domestic grade NaOCl [3%–5%
available Cl] per 1,000 gal of CT/EC water; or 0.6 lb [0.3 kg] Ca[OCl]2 per
1,000 gal of CT/EC water. If significant biodeposits are present, additional
chlorine may be required. If the volume of water in CT/EC is unknown, it can
be estimated (in gallons) by multiplying either the recirculation rate in gallons
per minute by 10 or the refrigeration capacity in tons by 30. Other appropriate
compounds may be suggested by a water-treatment specialist.
B. Record the type and quality of all chemicals used for disinfection, the exact
time the chemicals were added to the system, and the time and results of FRC
and pH measurements.
*Adapted from information published previously by the Wisconsin Department of Health and
Social Services, 1987 (463 ).
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C. Add dispersant simultaneously with or within 15 minutes of adding disin-
fectant. The dispersant is best added by first dissolving it in water and adding
the solution to a turbulent zone in the water system. Automatic-dishwasher
compounds are examples of low or nonfoaming, silicate-based dispersants.
Dispersants are added at 10–25 lbs (4.5–11.25 kg) per 1,000 gal of CT/EC water.
D. After adding disinfectant and dispersant, continue circulating the water
through the system. Monitor the FRC by using an FRC-measuring device (e.g.,
a swimming-pool test kit), and measure the pH with a pH meter every
15 minutes for 2 hours. Add chlorine as needed to maintain the FRC at
≥10 mg/L. Because the biocidal effect of chlorine is reduced at a higher pH,
adjust the pH to 7.5–8.0. The pH may be lowered by using any acid (e.g.,
muriatic acid or sulfuric acid used for maintenance of swimming pools) that is
compatible with the treatment chemicals.
E. Two hours after adding disinfectant and dispersant or after the FRC level is
stable at ≥10 mg/L, monitor at 2-hour intervals and maintain the FRC at
≥10 mg/L for 24 hours.
F. After the FRC level has been maintained at ≥10 mg/L for 24 hours, drain the
system. CT/EC water may be drained safely into the sanitary sewer. Municipal
water and sewerage authorities should be contacted regarding local
regulations. If a sanitary sewer is not available, consult local or state authorities
(e.g., Department of Natural Resources) regarding disposal of water. If
necessary, the drain-off may be dechlorinated by dissipation or chemical
neutralization with sodium bisulfite. 
G. Refill the system with water and repeat the procedure outlined in steps 2–6 in
Section I-B above.
III. Mechanical cleaning
A. After water from the second chemical disinfection has been drained, shut
down the CT/EC. 
B. Inspect all water-contact areas for sediment, sludge, and scale. Using brushes
and/or a low-pressure water hose, thoroughly clean all CT/EC water-contact
areas, including the basin, sump, fill, spray nozzles, and fittings. Replace
components as needed.
C. If possible, clean CT/EC water-contact areas within the chillers.
IV. After mechanical cleaning
A. Fill the system with water and add chlorine to achieve FRC level of 10 mg/L.
B. Circulate the water for 1 hour, then open the blowdown valve and flush the
entire system until the water is free of turbidity.
C. Drain the system.
78 MMWR January 3, 1997
D. Open any air-intake vents that were closed before cleaning.
E. Fill the system with water. CT/EC may be put back into service using an effective
water-treatment program.
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